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THESIS ABSTRACT 
The question as to whether empirical knowledge has 
any foundations and, if it does, just what those foundations 
might be, has long been an important epistemological ques-
tion. The problem with which I am concerned is that of 
taking 11rimitive sensory experience as the ground of em-
pirical knowledge. I consider three attempts on the part 
of 20th century British and American analytical philosophers 
to substantiate our ordinary knowledge claims about an 
extra-mental, empirical reality. The first of these is 
the sense-datum approach to the problem, in which by using 
the act-object a.-rialysis of simple sensations, the independent 
status of things sensed was thought to be established. But 
I point out that the sense-datum theorists do not prove the 
point they set out to prove, but only succeed in illuminat-
i:1g the fundamental assumptions of Realism in opposition to 
those of Idealism. In opposition to the sense-datum Realists, 
I a.dvar.ce the adverbial analysis of sensation, and in so 
doing open the way to a less direct but more credible 
Realism. 
The second part considers the nrotocol-statement 
theories, according to which empirical knowledge is (or 
corresponds to) a truth-functional syntactical system of pro-
positions ultimately grounded on a class of atomic proposi-
iii 
tionsz the ~rotocol statements. It becomes apparent that 
the protocol-statement theories must choose between sub-
jectivism and corrigibility. The relation of empirical 
knowledge claims to subjective sense experiences is prob-
lematic. 
Finally, I relate the attempt made to rework the 
phenomenalistic and physicalistic epistemic systems of 
the Logical Positivists along the lines of warranting re-
lations rather than implicative relations. Thus sensory 
experience comes to have an evidence-conferring relation to 
empirical knowledge claims. But that relation is a com-
plex one which must be determined in the light of all our 
relevant information; particularly that regarding the 
causal conditions prevailing in our perceptual environment. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE SENSE-DATUM THEORIES 
The discussion of the role of sensation as a means 
of obtaining knowledge about the physical world which arose 
among British and American philosophers early in the twen-
tieth century is but a part of a much older and wider dis-
cussion about the relation of mind to other forms of reality 
which has characterized philosophical dialogue from its 
inception. In this paper I isolate and analyze the central 
arguments about the role of sensory perception in giving 
evidence for beliefs about the "external world., propounded 
by contemporary philosophers in the analytical tradition. 
The areas treated fall into three groups: (1) The sense-datum 
theories; (2) The protocol sentence theories; and (3) The 
warrant statement theories. My first step in analyzing 
the evidential status of perception is an investigation of 
the sense-datum theories as they were introduced in the 
early decades of this century. 
The birth of analytical philosophy, and with it 
Realism in the English-speaking world is usually (though 
simplistically) identified with the rejection of Idealism 
by G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. Standing for the vir-
tues of the ''scientific outlook" { in the case of Russell) 
or for the ''common-sense" view of the world { in Moore's 
1 
2 
case) over against what thoy took to be the speculative 
excesses of Idealism, these philosophers were eager to prove 
that human beings are sometimes directly aware of entities 
existing neither in their ovm minds nor in some Absolute 
Mind. 
However, in answering the question "'What are the ob-
jects of perception?"', Moore and Russell heeded the signifi-
gance of Idealism's fundamental, though overemphasized, in-
sight that the known i!3 structured according to the knower's 
conceptual frame. This revival of Realism was of a rather 
limited and qualified variety, even in the case of the so-
called Naive Realists. Indeed, the Realism of the sense-
datum theorists reduces the world of things that can be 
directly known in perception to its minimal form. The 
sense-datum theorists accomodated the facts of the active 
role played by the mind in producing the objects of know-
ledge by clearly distinguishing two radically different ways 
of knowing. 
Russell, in his The Problems of Philosophy 1 , gives 
the most well-knovm account of this distinction by deliniat-
ing ... knowledge by acquaintance~ and "knowledge by descrip-
tion." One knows something by acquaintance when he knows it 
without any process of inference of any knowledge of truths. 
On the other hand, things are known by description when 
they are taken to stand in particular relations to those 
1Betrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London• 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1912):--pp. 46-59. 
:3 
entities which are know.:s by acquaJ.n tance. According to 
Russell, there are things which are known by acquaintance, 
and some of these are the .. ... ..... 1mrneaia ve objects of sense ex-
perience, which he calls sense-data. Those things which 
are known soley in terms of their relations to sense-data 
are those things we would normally call physical objects. 
In an early article Russell pointed out the difference be-
tween those things with which we are acquainted (here he 
calls these "presentations") and those things we only know 
about since they can only be "reached'' by "denoting phrases.• 2 
Russell's demarcation of knowledge which is given and know-
ledge which is influenced, orderedi or structured by the 
mind also appears when he defines sense-data as the •non-
rnnemic elements in a sensation,,.) and as that which is be-
lieved on its own account, without the support of outside 
evidence-- 9•hard data" which is given rather than derived. 4 
G. E. Moore sought a similar bifurcation of knowledge 
when he described sense-data as that class of objects which 
we know by "direct apprehension." He writes• 
..• there is a most important difference 
between the relation I have to a sensible when 
I am actually seeing or hearing it and any re-
lation (for there may be several) which I may have 
to the same sensible when I am only thinking of 
2Betrand Russell, "On Denoting, .. Mind, 14 (1905), 
pp. 479-98. reprinted in R. C. I'f.arsh, ed. Logic and Knowledge, p.41 
3Betrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind(London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1921), p. 189. 
4Betrand Russell, On Our Knowledge of the External 
World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1914)-,-p--;-;/6. 
4 
or remembering it. A!-;d I want to express this 
difference by using a uarticular term for the 
former .•. direct ap~rehens5on.' 
Later Moore maintained the same distinction, referring to 
that which is given as opposed to what is only "worked 
up by the mind.• 6 
Clearly, the early Moore and Russell took the fact 
that people know certain entities in a unique way, that of 
being given to the knower, as compelling evidence for the 
Realist position. The supposition, that if something is 
merely given to or presented to the mind it cannot at the 
same time be the product of the mind's formative activity, 
seems to be self-evident. That which is given in sensation 
presents a °'facticity" for the mind which senses. T. P. Nunn, 
also a founder of the New Realism, wrote that {even in the 
case of a pain, generally considered the most "subjective" 
of sensations) the sensation "may present itself as a thing 
to be reckoned with as much as St. Paul's Cathedral • . . 
the pain is like St. Paul's, something outside my mind, with 
which my mind may come into various relations." 7 , There 
is, in this immediate contact of mind and external reality, 
"'no room" for the mind to doubt, do away with, change, or 
/ .. ,· 
5a. E. Moore, "The Status of Sense-Data," Philos-
ophical Studies (London• Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), p.173. 
6G. E. Moore, "Are the Materials of Sense Affections 
of the Mind?P', Proceedings .Qf the Aristotelian Society, 17 
(1916-17), p. 419. 
7T. P. Nunn, "Are Secondary Qualities Independent of 
Perception?" PAS, 10 (1909-10), p. 195. 
5 
in any way manipulate ttuit •,.;-hich :ts given. 
It is plausible to interpret the emphasis placed on 
the giveness of the sense-datum as an attempt to restore the 
immediately apprehended to a position it had lost during 
Absolute Idealism's long fascination with the active role 
of the mind in synthesizing knowledge. This interpretation, 
however, stands in need of qualification. C. I. Lewis, in 
his Mind and the World Order, writess 
Post-Kantian Idealism ... may seem to contend 
for the identification of knowledge with what the 
activity of thought alone produces. But idealism 
can hardly mean to deny that the fact of my seeing 
at this moment a sheet of white paper instead of 
a green tree is a datum which it is beyond the power 
?f my thought ts alter. It can hardly deny the given 
1.11 every sense. 
There is considerable evidence in the Idealist literature 
that Lewis' claim is correct. We find T. H. Green, in his 
Prolegomena to Ethics, acknowledging the ,.derivation of 
knowledge from an experience of unalterably related phen-
omena,09 and F. H. Bradley, in Apnearance and Reality;, quite 
willing to accept the "presentations" espoused by the Phen-
omenalists he opposes. 10 
Lewis continues: ~the idealist may insist that there 
is no (real) object without the creative activity of mind 
8c. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New Yorks 
Scribner's, 1929s reprint ed., New Yorks Dover, 1956), p. 45. 
9T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxfords Clarendon, 
1906), p. 17• -
1°F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2d ed., 
(London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1897), pp. 106-7, 
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without in the least meaning -to ds ny that there is a datum 
prior to its being posited as real. 1111 Green completes the 
sentence I quoted above this way: '' ..• unalterably related 
9henomena related in some consciousness." The Idealists, 
it seems, did not deny the given element in perception, 
but insisted that, in the broadest sense, it is not inde-
pendent of mind. 
It is not a refusal to admit the given but a view 
on the status of relations which constitutes the core of the 
Idealist doctrine; a doctrine the Realist, if he is to argue 
successfully, must refute. That which was problematic for 
the British Idealists was the status of the unrelated. 
Different approaches to this problem led the Idealists to 
radically diverse conclusions. Green, on the basis of the 
dogma that the existence of relations implies the existence 
of a relating mind, granted that there is a given element 
in perception, but maintained that this, even in its most 
primitive form, is a relation and thus mind-constituted. 
That which is not related is thoroughly unintelligible and 
unreal. Bradley, on the other hand, also began with the 
ideality of relations, but added the thesis that the concept 
of a relation is self-contradictory. Thus that which is 
thought, i.e., related, is mere appearance while the real 
is the unitary experience prior to its division into the 
subject-object relational structure by the abstracting 
mind. These otherwise disparite views are at one in affirm-
11c. I. Lewis, r•!lind and the l"/ orld Order, o. 46. 
7 
ing the separation of relations from ~hat which is inde-
pendent of mind. 
If we assume that on the sense-datum theory the 
primitive datum of sense contains related elements (e.g., 
a red patch consists of the elements "red-rectangle-here-
now"), then the force of the Realist argument must not lie 
with the fact of there being a given per se, but in there 
being a given manifold (of simples in relation) which is 
not mind-dependent. The Idealists held, in one way or another, 
the first of these points, but denied the second. The 
doctrine that relations are not "'real,H but exist only in 
a relating mind, appears to have been powerful enough to 
overcome the common-sense belief, mentioned above, that 
the given is independent of consciousness. Although it is 
not my purpose here to trace this belief to its origins, 
I want to point out its implications. 
Green considers the everyday phenomena of relations, 
in which he finds the "mystery" of "the existence of many in 
one." 12 Every relation, he says, is "the unity of the mani-
fold.013 "The one relation is a unity of many things."' 14 
There must be, he concludes, "something other than the 
manifold things themselves, which contains them without 
effacing their severality." 15 Particular entities, although 
distinct, are brought together by a mind which compares or 
relates them; that is the only conceivable ground for the 
12T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 33-5. 
l3Ibid. 14Ibid. l5Ibid. 
8 
existence of relations. Eut this inference from the simul-
taneous unity and diversity inherent in relations to their 
ideality is too facile. The contention seems to be based 
upon an equivocation of two senses of "relation"s what we 
may call the mentalistic sense, in which we may say that 
an individual mind relates things to one another or discovers 
relations in the world, and a "real" sense, according to which 
we can attribute relations to entities outside any mind. That 
the idea of an unknown relation is not obviously self-
contradictory is clear to me at the present time, but I 
do not intend to argue this point, but only wish to point 
our that the real nature of relations is the fundamental 
tenet of the Realist position. 
A difficulty that comei into view on the Idealist 
position is apparent in . the following remark from Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason: "all combination--be we conscious 
of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold in in-
tuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts--
is an act of the understanding. 1116 It is apparent that Kant's 
proviso indicates that one may have something given to him 
which seems other than it is. Does it make any sort of 
sense to say that the given is other than it seems? Isn't 
it true that if we restrict ourselves to that which is ac-
tually given in sensation that which is really given will 
coincide with that which seems to be given? H. H. Price 
16rmmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. 
Norman Kemp Smith (New Yorks St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 151. 
9 
a proponent of the senEi::-datum th&ory, argues that any such 
view as Kant's is nonsense. He writes, 
We might say that the notio~ of seeming has no 
application to the given, and that by the very de-
finitions of •seeming• and of •given' . When A seems 
to be B, this really means that some mind unreflec-
tively believes A to be B, or as we say 'takes' it to 
be B. Now if so, there must be some evidence upon 
which this taking is (however hastily and unreflective-
ly) based. Thus if it seems to me to be raining, the 
evidence is that I hear a pitter-patter sound. This 
does not~ to be a pitter-patter sound; it _Ls one. 
And only because there .i§. this sound can it seem 
to have a certain cause, viz. rain falling on the roof. 
And though the rain which there seems to be may not 
after all exist (for it may be a shower of gravel 
or peas) the sound nonetheless exists, and does 
have a pitter-patter character. In short, the Given 
is by definition that which by being itself actual and 
intuitively apprehended, makes it possible for some-
thin~ elr~ to seem to exist or to have a certain 
quality. l 
Accepting Price's position that a given sense-datum 
cannot be other than it is, the Idealist belief that a 
datum may be related by the mind but appear related in 
reality seems to be nonsensical. But a clarification is 
in order. We must distinguish two different types of 
false appearances. The first, of which Price's case is 
an example, consists of cases in which a datum is thought 
to have some property which it does not in fact have. At 
face value, Price's argument has shown that such appearances 
cannot deviate from reality. The second kind of false ap-
pearance, which the Idealist will say is possible, is that 
of a datum appearing to have a particular origin when in 
fact it has some other origin. The simple datum of sense, 
17H. H. Price, Perception, 2d ed., (Londons Methuen, 
1954), p. 5. 
10 
as a manifold, which appears to be real but is actually 
ideal, belongs to this variety of false appearings. Since 
I believe that Price may be wrong on both interpretations, 
I will not here press the argument. In the second section 
of the thesis I consider the question of the incorrigibility 
of simple sense perceptions. 
In order to explicate the force of the argument that 
attempts to show that the nature of sense-data evidences 
a real world, a fundamental terminological clarification 
is in order. There is an equivocation, due to fundamentally 
different approaches to the problem of the mind-reality 
relation, which lies beneath the surface of the ~giveness 
argument" for Realism. This difference between the two points 
of view becomes salient when we ask what each side of the 
debate means by uconsciousness." The Realist equates that 
which is given to the mind with that which is given to cons-
ciousness. So for him ~mindp and #consciousness~ denote the 
same entity as far as being given to is concerned• the un-
conscious mind is not a receptacle for data from the outside. 
That which is given to consciousness or to the mind or to 
the knowing subject is, for the Realist, all one. 
The Idealist, on the other hand, differentiates that 
which is given to consciousness from that which is given to 
the mind, Thus he can admit a given element in knowledge 
and simultaneously hold that this given element is the work 
of the mind and not real but ideal. A broad schematization 
of the two epistemologies will make this clear. For Realism, 
that which is given to the mind, i.e. immediately apprehended 
11 
by consciousness, is the se:1se-datuf,1, a group of qualities 
standing in a determina.te relation. The sense-datum consti-
tutes an objective, extra-mental, real entity. The mind 
then relates the sense-data to physical objects which are 
known by means of them in some derivative way. The Idealist 
schema. roughly corresponds to the sense-datum Realism in so 
far as the mind structures the nrimitive sense-data so as 
to produce ideas of physical objects. But, presupposing 
the ideality of relations, the Idealist takes sense-data, 
although given to the consciousness of the individual, to 
be previously related in- another part of the individual mind, 
in one variety or another of an Absolute rv~ind, or related by 
some objective system of concepts. So the non-mental world 
remains unintelligible for the Idealist and is usually 
dis~ensed with in his ontologies. 
The giveness of the sense-datum does not unambiguous-
ly provide evidence for its extra-mental reality. But there 
are other Realist arguments. The Realists' attempt to 
prove, on the basis of the intentional character of per-
ception the independence of sense-data, makes up the second 
major argument against the Idealists. 
While Moore still belonged to the Idealist camp he 
had already shovm his concern for the objectivity and 
independence of the objects of thought from the individual 
mind over against the Empiricist doctrines that the objects 
of thought are merely ideas in the individual mind. In his 
12 
"'The Nature of Judgement" 18 I/oor~ takes Bradley to task for 
not clearly maintaining the distinction between ideas as 
mental states (Vorstellung) and ideas as ''universal 
meanings" or concepts (Bergriff). 
The argument begins in earnest with Moore's ,.The 
Refutation of Idealism.~ 19 Here introspection of the nature 
of perceptual consciousness itself is taken as providing 
evidence for the extra-mental status o:f the objects of 
perception. Against the doctrine that, for the objects 
of perception, esse is pericipi, Moore writes that the 
Idealist fails to see that subject and object are distinct, 
that they are two, at a11. 20 He writes of the Idealist, thats 
... when he thinks of 'yellow' and when he 
thinks of the sensation of yellow he fails to 
see that there is anything in the later which is not 
in the former. This being so, to deny that yellow 
can ever be apart from the sensation of yellow is 
merely to deny that yellow can be other than it is; 
since yellow and the sensation of yellow are ab-
solutely identica1.21 
The esse is pericipi doctrine is only a tautology if 'x' 
and the sensation of 'x' are identical. But if it is not 
true that, in perception, subject and object are identical, 
then the applicability of esse is pericipi to cases of 
sensation is a matter of fact and open to empirical verifi-
cation. 
We must recognize that, for example; 
18 a. E. Moore, ~on The Nature of Judgement," Mind, 8 
(1899), pp. 176-93. 
19 · G. E. Moore, uThe Refutation of Idealism," Philos-
ophical Studies (Londons Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922) pp. 1-JO. 
20Ibid., p. 1J. 21Ibid. 
13 
.•. the sensation of blue differs from that of 
green. But it is plain that if both a.re sensations 
they also have some point in common ... I will call 
the common element (1) 'consciousness•, in respect 
of which all sensations are alike; and (2) something 
else, in resnect of which one sensation differs from 
another. It-will be convenient if I may be allowed 
to call this second term the 'object' of the sensation. 
Thus .,blue is one object of sensation, and green is another, 
and consciousness, which both sensations have in common, is 
different from either." Moore points our that "sometimes 
the sensation of blue exists in my mind and sometimes it does 
not ••• if one tells us that to say "blue exists" is the 
~ thing as to say that ~both blue and consciousness 
exist~ he makes a mistake.~ To identify any object of 
sensation with that sensation is to identify a part either 
with the whole of which it is a part or else with the other 
part of the same whole. 22 On the basis of what it seems 
very likely we are all introspectively aware of in our own 
sensations, and on Moore's analysis of the concepts we 
ordinarily apply to those sensations, the a priori ground 
for (subjective) Idealism is undermined. It is at the very 
least conceivable that the objects of sensation exist with-
out being sensed. 
As a Realist, Moore of course believes that the in-
dependence of the objects of sensation, of the sense-data, is 
not only conceivable but very often the case. He presents his 
most lucid argument for this belief in a later article, "Are 
22Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
14-
the Materials of Sense Affections of the Mind?" 23 This 
argument begins with Moore ;:;tating that there is a certain 
class of things which stand in a particular relation to the 
mind such that those things only exist when they stand in 
that relation to the mind. By way of example he writes 
"I think I do know ..• with regard to an act of attention 
of mine, which did exist, not merely that it has ceased to 
be mine, but that it has ceased to exist. But he finds it 
extremely doubtful whether the objects of simple sensations 
have that particular relational property, "I am unable to 
discover that they all have to me any relation at all 
except that which is constituted by their being presented 
to me." With regard to that relation--what we earlier 
referred to as ''giveness''--Moore says that this relation is 
not a relation which has the peculiar property in question. 24 
The reason Moore gives for saying that things which 
are presented to the mind do not have the property of exist-
ing only when they are so presented is that: 
. , . there seems to me to be a clear distinction 
between cases in which I do know with regard to a 
given sensation, which has been presented to me, not 
only that it has ceased to be presented to me, but 
also that it has ceased to exist, and cases in which 
I do know the former but do not know the latter. 
As an example of a situation in w~ich one knows that a 
sense-datum not only is no longer presented but no longer 
exists Moore cites the case of his watching a fire-work 
23G. E. Moore, 11Are the Materials of Sense Affections 
of the Mind?", pp. 426-9. 
24Ibid,1 p. 427-8. 
15 
display during which he sees a s ·11ark. falling through the 
. h' k . t ' d t· t ' ·t 2 5 rng, ,: s y, come in o existence an · ,hen cease ·o ex1s . 
Moore finds it incredible that acts of attention and the 
like, i.e., mental acts or states, be thought of as going 
about loose in the world, not occurring in semeone's mind. 
But he found the non-mental existence of the immediate datum 
of sense something he was quite ready to accept. It is to 
Moore's credit, as opposed to some of the other sense-datum 
theorists, th?-t he long entertained the belief that sense-
data are identical with parts of the surfaces of physical 
objects, and thus refrained from straying inordinately far 
from the common-sense that was his starting point. 
Russell used an argument similar to Moore's in·support 
of the thesis that the intentional structure of perceptual 
consciousness evidences their real existence. He writess 
..• there are two quite distinct things to be 
considered whenever an idea is before the mind. 
There is on the one hand the thing of which we are 
aware--say the colour of my table--and on the 
other hand the actual awareness itself, the men-
tal act of apprehending the thing. The mental act 
is undoubtedly mental, but is there any reason to 
suppose
2
that the thing a~prehended is in any sense 
mental? 6 · 
We find the most precise statement of the distinction 
on another part of the Realist front, in the writings of 
Franz Brentano. Against esse is pericipi for sensation 
Brentano wrotes 
As certain as it is that a color only appears to 
us when it is an object of our representation, it 
25Ibid. pp. 428-9. 
26Bertrand Russell, The ProbleIIl§. of Philosophx, p. 41. 
16 
is nevertheless not to be inferred from this that a 
color could not exis~ without being presented. Only 
if being presented were included as one factor in 
the color, just as a certain quality and intensity 
is included in it, would a color which is not pre-
sented signify a contradiction, since a whole without 
one of its parts is truly a ccntrad~ 7tion. This, however, is obviously not the case. 
As with Moore, Russell, and the other sense-datum theorists, 
Brentano's criticism of the esse is pericipi thesis constitutes 
what has come to be known as the act-object analysis of sen-
sory perceptions. The act-object analysis is of vital im-
portance to the Realist, for unless we can distinguish 
the thing thought about from the mental act by which that 
thing is thought about, the mind is limited to a knowledge 
merely of its own states or contents. 
The force of the act-object analysis of perception lies 
in its pointing out what appears to be a fundamental confusion, 
on the part of the Idealist, with two distinct senses of the 
term "in the mind." A univocal use of "in the mind," by which 
the term is intended to mean "being thought about," renders 
the Idealist contention that the objects of thought are in the 
mind a bare tautology. Or, if the term is used univocally 
to mean "actually existing in the mind." then the Idealist 
dogma is simply false. In the opinion of Moore and the early 
Russell the esse is pericipi doctrine of the Absolute Ideal-
ists stood at much the same level as the inference of "Jones 
is a mental entity" from "Smith is keeping Jones in mind." 
27Franz Brentano, "The Distinction Between Mental and 
Physical Phenomena," trans. D. B. Terrell in Chisholm, ed. 
Realism fill~ the Back}roupd of Phenomenology (Glencoe, Ill.s 
The Free Press, 1960 . p.54. 
17 
I shall consider the ac t~ob j ~:c t a.-.:,R.1ysis of sensory per-
ception in two ways: first, the reaction of the Idealists 
themselves to the argument, and then the attempted replace-
ment of the analysis with another, The Idealist counter-
arguments come in two varieties. The first of these is 
represented by C. A. Strong, who, beginning with cases whose 
subjectivity seemed to him to be certain, went on to attack 
the act-object analysis using such cases as a model on which 
to interpret the introspective data found by the Realists. 
Strong writes that, in the case of someone's having a pain, 
that pain is almost always attended by thoughts about the 
pains 
I rarely experience a pain without saying to myself, 
What a disagreeable feeling this is, and asking myself 
what I can do to remove it: or, at the very least, I 
dimly note its local relations to other parts of my 
body. 2~ 
The pain is a mental fact before one transforms it into an 
object of thought, says Strong, thereby distinguishing a 
mental fact from those thoughts that always directly 
follow it into existence. He continues, 
The suggestion I would offer is that, when we con-
trast a pain with our consciousness of it, the fact 
we refer to by the 'consciousness' is these super-
numerary thoughts. We feel ourselves to be other 
than the pain, because we identify ourselves with the 
thoughts~ and the thoughts are really and truly other 
than it. 9 
What Moore takes to be the ''transparent" and "difficult to 
28c. A. Strong, "Has Mr. Moore Refuted Idealism?"' 
Mind 14 (1905) p. 175. 
29Ibid. 
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fix• element in a sensatlon, that is, the subject, merital 
t . JO ac , or consciousness, Strong maintains is not there at 
all. ~oore's failure to clarify his concepts of ~mind" 
and "consciousness" is again significant. Strong tells 
us that Moore is quite justified in insisting on a dualistic 
analysis of sensation. For the existence of the mental 
state is certainly distinct from the reflective intellectual 
consciousness by which we apprehend it. Yet Moore's failing 
is his inability to see that the existence of the mental 
state is by no means independent of consciousness in the 
sense of feeling.3 1 
The Idealist response to Moore's "The Refutation of 
Idealism" continued in this vein. J. S. Mackenzie, a Scottish 
Idealist, went so far as to contend that the refutation of 
the esse is pericipi doctrine positively advances the cause 
of what he calls "Objective Idealism." Mackenzie, in agree-
ment with Moore, writes, 
Certainly, pain, hunger, the colour yellow, a tree, 
a triangle .•• all contain something which is of the 
nature of an ob~ective material set before our con-
sciousness and it ij 2something of which somebody else might be conscious. 
Building on the distinction between the idea as fact and the 
idea as meaning, r--nackenzie holds that that which is given in 
consciousness (the idea as fact) insofar as it is intelligible, 
JOG. E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism" pp.24--5. 
31strong, "Has Mr. Moore Refuted Idealism?" pp. 188. 
32J. L. Mackenzie, "The New Realism and the Old 
Idealism", Mind 15 (1906), 315. 
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is referred to an object:b -e systsm of ideas as meanings. :33 
While the act-object analysis of sensation was acceptable 
to the Idealists as a critique of the theory that those 
things we perceived depend for their existence upon our 
consciousness of them, they did not find it an adequate dis-
proof of the fundamental contention that reality is ultimate-
ly Ideal, whether they held the "ideas" to exist in an 
Absolute Mind or as components of an objective system in-
dependent of any consciousness, be it human or superhuman. 
The strength of the Realist doctrine that the act-
object analysis can be properly applied to simple sensations 
lies in their pointing out the intentional structure of 
perceptual consciousness. But in not fully elucidating it 
(as the Europeans did), the British Realists were led to 
insist that the intentional objects of sensations were 
not only objects of consciousness to be distinguished from 
that consciousness itself, but entirely existentially 
independent of anything mental and therefore real entities. 
This belief: that the sense-datum is not mind-dependent, 
coupled with the traditional arguments from perceptual il-
lusion which prevented the identification of them with 
physical objects, led the Realists to a vast network of 
problems concerning the status of sense-data in the external 
physical world and their relations to ordinary physical ob-
jects. If we take Realism as the belief that we live in a 
world in which the primary objects are everyday physical 
33Ibid., p. J18. 
objects, the sense-data 
Realism. 
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led us far afield of 
The early reaction of Idealism ta the act-object 
analysis was a harbringer of a second, more radical ob-
jection to its thoroughgoing application to perception. 
I take the "adverbial" analysis of perception to undermine 
the sense-datum form of Realism and to provide the ground-
work for a more workable Realism based upon the warranting 
character of perceptual reports. The adverbial analysis 
is developed to the greatest extent in the work of Curt 
Ducasse, but we find earlier references to it in the writings 
of the Idealist critics of the sense-datum theorists. 
C. A. Strong, in the article I mentioned above, 
referred to the distinction between things thought about 
and "feelings," affections of the mind. These feelings, 
Strong says, are "qualities of consciousness."3 4 What Moore 
objectified as sense-data Strong considers to be species 
of feeling. Thus, the two sentences: (1) Feeling is some-
thing unique and different from everything else: (2) Feeling 
of pain is entirely indistinguishable from pain--are not 
in conflict, given that pain is one mode of feeling, exper-
ience, or consciousness,35 On Moore's act-object analysis 
of perception, these sentences are antinomous, since the 
thing felt is other than the feeling of it. 
It was, as I have said, Curt Ducasse who gave this 
34c. A. Strong, "Has Mr. Moore Refuted Idealism?" p. 176. 
35Ibid., p. 182. 
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way of explicating the phenc~enon of sensation its most 
precise formulation. Ducasse, in what has become a classic 
treatment of Moore's ~the Refutation of Idealismu, observes 
that the argument against esse is pericipi dep~nds on the 
thesis that existential independence is a function of the 
type of distinctness that obtains between e.g. the sensation 
of blue, and blue, the object of that sensation. If Moore's 
argument is to be shown valid what must be established is 
that the object of consciousness and the consciousness of 
the object are related in such a way that (like 'green' and 
'sweet•) 36 each is existentially free of the other (unlike 
'green' and'color'). 
As we have seen, Moore and the other proponents of 
the act-object analysis substantiate the claim of exist-
ential independence for the sense-datum by analyzing sen-
sory consciousness as a variety of consciousness in general 
and thus partaking in its intentionality, or, as Moore himself 
calls it, its unique relation of being of something. Aware-
ness, standing in this unique intentional relation to its ob-
ject, is such that its object is always something other 
than itself and never mere ''content"; otherwise no awareness, 
not even self-awareness, is possible. 37 From this fact 
Moore assumes that the relation between a sensation and 
the thing sensed must be one of existential independence 
:i.f there is to be any awareness o:f the thing at all. 
36Moore, ~The Refutation of Idealism,# p. 16. 
J?Ib1·d., 24 5 pp. - . 
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Ducasse attempts to u:r:dermine ·Moore's doctrine that 
the directedness of an;y m-2ntal act entails the existential 
indenendence of its ooje~t by arguing that although there 
is a particular relation between awareness and object such 
that these are in some sense logically distinct, there are 
different possibilities for what kind of logical distinctness 
this may be. We may, Ducasse says, distinguish two varieties 
of this relations that in which the object is logically dis-
tinct and also existentially independent of the awareness of 
it; and that in which the object is only logically distinct 
and is existentially dependent upon the awareness. 
The correllative of this distinction Ducasse finds in 
the linguistic distinction between the ''connate accusative" 
and the ''alien accusative".3 8 For example, the term ''act of 
striking" may take a connate accusative--''stroke", or it may 
take an alien accusative-- "a man", Ducasse further differ-
entiates by adding qualifications of generality so as to give 
four possibilities for a term's accusativess 
"obstacle'' is an alienly coordinate accusative of "'jump-
ing" 
"jump'' is a connately coordinate accusative of "jumping" 
''fence" is an alienly subordinate accusative of ".jumping .. 
"leap" is a connately subordinate accusative of "jumping"39 
Having made these distinctions, Ducasse considers the 
relation of these subject-accusative relationships to the quest-
ion of existential independence. An object denoted by the alien 
38c. J. Ducasse, "Moore's 'The Refutation of Idealism' ", 
in P.A. Schlipp, ed., 2d ed., The Philosouhy of G. E. Moore 
(New Yorks Tudor, 1952), p. 228. 
39Ibid., pp. 229, 246. 
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accusative of a given activity, e.g., uobstacle" (alienly 
coordinate) or "fence'' (alienly subordinate) of "jump-
ing", may, on what seems a view in accord with ordinary 
usage, exist even when the activity is not taking place. 
On the other hand, the object denoted by the connate 
accusative of a term does depend for its existence upon 
the activity t_aking place. There is no jump (connate 
coordinate) but in the jumping and there is no leap (con-
. ) 1 h . 1 . . 40 nate subordinate un ess t ere is a so someone Jumping. 
Now if it should be the case--and Ducasse maintains 
that it is--that the accusative objects (cognita) of men-
tal activities (cognizings) which are inherently intentional 
are connate accusatives, then it must be that those act-
ivities are existentially dependent upon their connate 
mental activities. "A cognitum connate with the cognizing 
thereof exists only in the cognizing. 41 Presumably, one 
who wanted to defend Moore's attack on the esse is pericipi 
of sense-data could accept Ducasse's analysis while main-
taining that ~blue", "sweet", "bitter", and the like, are 
alien rather than connate accusatives of the mental acts by 
which they are apprehended. But on a consideration of 
the possibilities which Ducasse advances, it is difficult 
to see someone holding to that belief. Ducasse believes 
that the accusative object of a cognizing, which we would 
commonly call a sense-datum, can only be a connately sub-
ordinate cognitum. Giving as an exa~ple the variety of 
40 Ibid., pp. 228-9. 41 Ibid., p. 231, 
mental activities we calJ. 
sibilities may be derived, 
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!!' : f.,. c...,·t-1· n -·-~ 
l,t"_ •. 1. ) V . ~ j the following pas-
The alienly coordinate cogni tum of ''tasting" is ~Jphysi-
cal substance"'. 
The connately coordinate cognitum of "tasting" is "taste". 
The alienly subordinate cognitum of "tasting" is e.g. 
"quinine". 
The conna~el:,r subordinate cogniturn of "tasting" is e.g. 
"bitter''. ~ 
This analysis follows the accusative analysis of ~jumping" 
and seems to be the only one which provides accusatives 
that would complete the sentence function nr am tasting 
(a) _____ " so as to comply with normal, everyday use 
of the language. 
If one tastes a physical object, such as a quantity 
of quinine, there is ordinarily no reason to doubt the 
existential independence of that physical object from the 
mental act of sensing. However, if someone "tastes a 
taste" or if he "tastes bitterness", it seems to be the case 
that what he experiences is in no way independent of the 
sense experience itself. So these "entities", the most 
likely candidates for the role of sense-data, are actually 
existentially dependent upon their being sensed. 
Before going on to Ducasse•s positive account of the 
status of sense-data we should ask whether this description 
of the objects of sensation has gone to the heart of Moore's 
attempt to refute the esse is pericipi thesis for sense-
data. To have done so, Ducasse must have shown that.the 
connate cognita of sense experiences are not merely exist-
42 Ibid., p. 247. 
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entially dependent on their connate sense-experiences, but 
that they are necessarily so. 
Moore, against the Idealists ~ho held that ~the 
object of experience is inconceivable apart from the sub-
ject,43 asserted that, for example, the two terms "yellow" 
and ''the sensation of yellow~ have distinct meanings, and 
therefore cannot logically be the same. According to Moore 
the facts ~present themselves in a kind of antinomys (1) Ex-
perience is something unique and different from everything 
elses (2) Experience of green is indistinguishable from 
green. 044 Idealists escape this contradiction by fleeing to 
the ruse of the "organic unity", in which two elements are 
supposedly distinct; yet nothing can be asserted about either 
element which cannot be truly asserted of the whole. The 
idea of the organic unity, grounded in the internality of 
relations, as espoused in Idealist logic, is the basis of the 
esse is pericipi of sense-data. The question as to whether 
the Idealists are correct in asserting that known and knower 
constitute such an organic unity, and even whether such a 
state of affairs is possible, does not concern us here. The 
point, however, is that Moore saw this doctrine as the one 
according the Idealists the right to assert esse is pericipi 
of the objects of sensation. 
The question relevant to the application of the ad~ 
verbial analysis to sensation and the ensuing admittance 
43 Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism,., p. 12. 
44 Ibid • , p . 14 . 
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of the esse is pericipi doctrine, is whether a sense-datum, 
which as Moore and Ducasse agree, is logically distinct from 
its cognizing, may consistently be said to exist in-
dependently of that cognizing. Ducasse, in his application 
of the model of the accusative case to sensation argues 
that such is not the case. Yet Ducasse does not appeal to 
the organic unity concept to support this contention. As 
we have seen, the differentiation of the accusative ob-
jects of verbs reveals the existential dependence of certain 
objects upon the connate activity. However, perhaps Ducasse's 
application of the accusative case model to cognition in 
general and specifically to sensations is an implicit denial 
of Moore's "perfectly unique and distinct relation" 45 be-
tween a sensation and its object. It appears that it is 
just this relation of awareness to object of awareness that 
falsifies the esse is pericipi thesis for any sense-datum. 
Moore and the other Realist philosophers could contend that 
the intentional character of cognition uniquely characterizes 
mental activities as distinct from other kinds of activities, 
and thus attribute to the objects of a sense experience a 
peculiarly independent status. On this approach the 
attempt to consider sensation as one among many activities 
and thereby having objects as other activities do would 
appear to be fundamentally misguided. If the objects of 
.sensation experiences have a unique status, the accusative 
case analysis cannot be hastily applied to them. 
45Ibid., p. 24. 
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Ducasse 's positive response to the 1'Refutation of 
Idealismu is his analysis of sense-data as the conna.tely 
subordinate cognita of certain mental activities. As 
subordinate cognita, these entities are specific instances 
of the generic connate activity. Thus the ~adverbial analysisu 
appellation, according to which blue is not the object of a 
particular sensation in the sense that the object and the 
sensation are different things; rather blue is one variety 
of sensation. A blue-sensation is a species of the genus 
sensation. Thus, blue and the sensation of blue (or, as 
Moore would put it, consciousness of blue) are logically 
distinct entities in the commonly acknowledged sense that 
applies to the distinctness of a genus and one of its 
species. Further, blue and the sensation are existentially 
independent of one another in the sense that blue is one 
of many ,possible species of the genus sensation. On the 
adverbial analysis, one may say "I see bluely" rather than 
"I see blue", just as one may say, when he dances the specific 
kind of dance called a waltz, HI dance waltzily." 46 Yet, 
although it is in some sense true that we may describe 
our sense experiences adverbially, this is certainly a 
departure from ordinary use. 
Although the thesis that, in having a sensation, we 
are sensing in a particular way rather than sensing some 
doubtful entity such as the sense-datum, is an attractive 
46nucasse, "Introspection, Mental Acts, and Sensa", 
Mind 45 (1936) 1 190. - ' 
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one, it does not on fac~ value do justice to our ordinary 
sensory experience. In the great majority of cases in 
which one senses, he senses some object. Moore, in reply-
ing to Ducasse, comments that he "cannot see the sensible 
quality blue, without directly seeing something which has 
that quality--a blue patch, a blue speck, or a blue line, or 
a blue spot, etc. 1147 Although Moore was inclined to believe 
that~ sense-datum normally occurs as some object, it 
seems clear that, although they may be exceptionally rare, 
there are cases of sensation best described by the ordinary 
percipient in an adverbial manner. For example, should 
my entire visual field become blue, I would probably find 
"I sense bluely" the appropriate way to describe the 
experience. In the other cases of blue-awareness, such as 
seeing a blue spot, speck, or patch, one tends toward pre-
dicating that blue of something, even if it is only of a 
geometical shape, rather than using the unnatural ad-
verbial locution. Indeed, even a "pure" blue-experience, 
such as that mentioned above in the case of a visual field 
becoming entirely blue, would most likely be described at-
tributively (e.g., "I see a blue light") rather than ad-
verbially, despite the fact that the adverbial description 
is more accurate. The fact that we normally do tend to 
describe our sense experiences on an act-object analysis 
may well result f'rom the f'act that our language is pragmatic-
47 G. E. Moore, "A Reply to r.1y Critics," The Philosouhy 
of G, E. Moore, 2d ed. (New-Yorks rrudor, 1952), p. 659. 
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ally geared to the ordinary experience of relatively stable, 
property bearing physical things. From our experience of 
these ordinary physical objects we derive forms of dis-
course by which we describe all sensory experiences. 
There is, I believe, a more sienificant reason why 
we do not ordinarily apply the adverbial locutions to ex-
periences. The greatest part of our sensory experiences do 
not occur by themselves; that is, we only rarely have a 
particular sensation of, say, a color without also having 
other sensations. Most often, what happens is that the 
object of a sensation is no simple quality (e.g. red by 
itself) but at the very least a conjunction of qualities 
(e.g. red and rectangular and a certain size and position 
relative to other sense-data). J.O. Wisdom went further 
than this and pointed out that the sense-datum is always 
a particular--a "here" and "now", adverbs describing the 
existence of the particular sense-datum. 48 As I pointed out 
earlier, the given in perception is always a manifold of 
qualities. The reason why the adverbial mode of speech is 
not the one we ordinarily use is that an adverbial des-
cription of a specific sensation corresponds exactly to the 
adjectival description of the physical object perceived by, 
in, or with the mental state adverbially described. The 
objectivity of the things perceived is embedded in our 
perceptual language because it is just the experience of 
48J. O. Wisdom, "'The Analysis of Sense-Data," Analysis 
2 (1934-5)r 78-9, 
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composite qualities that ~e callt ~orrectly or not, per-
ceiving real objects in the world external to us. There 
is no need to limit the adverbial analysis to what have 
traditionally been called Hsecondary qualities,~ as Ducasse 
seems to. 49 If we may sense "bluely" may we not also 
sense "squarely''? And if this is the case, it is a matter 
of pragmatics whether we say (1) .,I sense bluely, squarely, 
here, now,'' and thus determine a particular way of being 
conscious, or (2) say "I sense a blue square here now" 
and thus explicitly denote a physical object in the ex-
ternal world. I think it is clear that the difference 
between these two ways of speaking about perception is 
that one is more useful than the other for getting along 
in the world. 
Yet one may ask whether the adverbial analysis is 
anything more than an account of our own mental states, 
i.e., of representations of the things in the physical 
world. !c1Iay it not be that what we adverbially describe are 
ideas in the mind and that we therefore do not perceive the 
things in the world but only imagine that we do? From the 
beginning of reflective thought about perception, questions 
of this kind have bedeviled attempts to accurately describe 
the phenomenon. It may be thought that the act-object 
analysis, by positing the independently existing real 
sense-datum, provides us with a truly Realist epistemology. 
What are Ducasse's connate subordinate cognita but our own 
49Ducasse, .,Moore• s 'The Refutation of Idealism, '"p. 228-31. 
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mental states? Ori the adverbial analysis, the perception 
of a physical object consists not in the immediate ap-
prehension of a fact or property in the external world, but 
merely in the existence of certain mental states. Can-
not one say that according to the adverbial analysis we 
never really perceive physical things, but only have mental 
states which are, at best, only causally connected with the 
entities in the external world? 
There is a fundamental confusion on this issue 
brought about by conflating two distinct kinds of mental 
events: 
(1) Being (perceptually) aware of a physical object; 
(2) Being (introspectively) aware of a sensation of a 
physical object. 
In the first case we are aware of something extra-mental 
and independent of our mind. In case (2) we are aware of 
something taking place in our own mind. I think it is widely 
accepted that these are two distinct, though often closely 
associated, mental events. Suppose we say that the existence 
of a particular mental event, such as "sensing bluely,• is 
causally dependent upon a certain physical state of affairs, 
e.g., the book in front of me reflecting a certain wave-
length of light through the air and into my eyes. We may 
say, and with some reason, that we are intellectually aware 
of the mental state when we are introspectively acquainted 
with it. Thus, when we introspect, we are not directly 
aware of the book, but only of the mental state connected 
with the book by a complex causal process. We can then say 
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that we don't lmow the t,cok directly, but only something 
in our mind related to the b0ok. But such introspection 
does not constitute perception. 
'I'he existence of the mental state, causally con-
nected with the book, is what constitutes our perceiving 
the book. The only way in which we may correctly say that 
we don't really perceive the book directly is by way of 
the comparison of perceptual awareness with some other variety 
of awareness that some other kind of being may have of things, 
or in contrast to the way we know our own mental sta:tm by 
introspection. Ignoring our introspection, or as C. A. 
Strong would have it, our "supernumerary thoughts," I 
contend that in having a perceptual mental state (such as 
"sensing bluely") I am aware of the book to which that men-
tal state is connected. That is what is meant by sense-
perception. The fact that perception is a kind of aware-
ness in which there is a causal relation between the mind 
and the object of awareness says nothing about what 
we are Hreally aware ofn in perception. 
Certainly, sense-perception is characterized by 
fallibility, due to the fact of its causal nature. But 
we are wrong if we imagine that because there is error,or 
even simply because sense-perception is causal, that what 
we perceive are always appearances and not the things 
themselves. Winston H.F. Barnes writesa ~If you wish 
to state only that something appears to be so and so, this 
can safely be dorie. But this is not a statement about some-
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thing made on . the piec~ of evi.denc!'.~ itself, which you 
already have before you, without clothing it in words.~ 50 
The value of the adverbial analysis, when coupled 
with a causal account of perception, lies in its ability 
to describe our sense-experience without introducing sense-
data or any other entity which we are aware of in some way 
which is perceptual but non-causal. Thus, if we accept the 
adverbial analysis, we are not Realists in the sense that 
Moore, the early Russell, and some of ·the other early 
Realists would have allowed, for we do not hold that we are 
acquainted with the elements of the external world, but 
only that we perceive the real world by way of the fal~ 
lible, causal process of sense-perception. In the ensuing 
portions of this paper I will in fact hold to some form of 
the adverbial analysis of sensation. The problem of the 
evidential status of perceptual experiences becomes the 
problem of assigning evidential values to mental states 
according to their causal relations to their objects in 
the physical world. 
5°winston H.F. Barnes, ttThe Myth of Sense-Data,~ in 
R. J. Swartz, ed. Perceiving, Sensi~g §lll! Yillowing (Garden 
City, NY1 Doubleday, 1965), p. 155, 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROTOCOL-STATEV~NT THEORIES 
Although, as I have shown in Chapter I, the nature 
of sense-experience does not, in itself, guarantee the 
existence of an external world of objects of our immediate 
awareness, the question remains as to whether sense-ex-
periences can constitute a secure basis for empirical know-
ledge. It has for a long time been apparent, at least to 
philosophers, that there is a problem about lmowledge. 
Perceiving the historical options of scepticism and dog_-
matism as giving us a choice between a Scylla and a Charyb-
dis, philosophers formulated what has come to be known as 
"the problem of the ~riterion. 051 As stated by Roderick 
Chisholm, the problem is as follows; we may know (1) the 
extent of our knowledge ai1d thus determine (2) the criteria 
for our knowledge. Or, we may know (2) and thereby find (1). 
The difficulty is that it seems we cannot know one of these 
until we know the other; thus they both remain unknown.5 2 
Here we have an uncertainty principle that throws all 
empirical knowledge claims into question. There are four 
51Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 56-69. 
52Roderick Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion 
(Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 197J)-,-p~12-14. 
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ways in which the problem of ..L• :..!le criterion may be approached. 
One may say that he does know the extent of his knowledge, 
and thus can determine criteria for knowing. Or instead, he 
may hold that he does have criteria and thereby can discover 
what he knows. He may say that he knows both of these things, 
each independently of the other. Or he may hold the scep-
tical position; maintaining his ignorance with regard to 
both. Those who hold the first three of these views be-
lieve that all human knowledge has a foundation of one 
kind or another. In finding a firm footing for our epistemic 
structure, philosophers have traditionally been guided by 
an ideal of certainty. That is, they have held that the 
human individual has epistemic access to certain propositions, 
the truth of which is self-evident. We can break down this 
group into two sub-groups. First, there are those who 
have maintained that knowledge is grounded in self-evident 
truths, and that these truths are either analytic, and thus 
certain, or perhaps synthetic a priori. As my concern in 
this paper is for the character of empirical knowledge, we 
will not investigate these claims. The other group con-
sists of those who hold that the criterion is self-evidence 
and that the certain basis for knowledge is self-evident 
perceptual propositions. Traditionally, this has been the 
view of those who hold the empirical criterion for know-
ledge, including the sense-data theorists. The argument for 
the empirical foundation of knowledge culminates in the 
protocol-statement theory of perceptual knowledge. It is to 
J6 
thl.·s theory and others ·i•,n:' .... J!t ·'-,,'n.-:., __· -;_·, _T a1..-"r:lre."LS myself 1.·n ' ·'- ... c:; • ' .. , - • -
this part of the thesis. 
The protocol-statement account of perceptual self-
evidence originates with the Vienna Circle. However, 
Wittgenstein, in his Tracta~us, had pointed out, that on 
the extensional interpretation of the structure of language, 
if there are meaningful complex statements, there must be 
"elementary propositions" which have given truth-values. 
Wittgenstein did not attempt to determine what type of 
proposition the elementary proposition may be; that, he wrote, 
is a question of the application of logic (5.557). Members 
of the Logical Positivist movement, under the influence of 
the Tractatus, attempted such an application of Wittgenstein's 
analysis of language. 
In his 1,hg_ Logical Structure of the World (1928), 
Rudolp Carnap formulated a "constructional system" by which 
he hoped to synthesize traditional rationalism and empiricism 
so as to give an account of how the mind, beginning with 
primitive elements, produces an organized system of know-
ledge.53 According to Carnap, the logical "construction~ 
of the intersubjective world of everyday experience and 
science can begin with logical operations upon simple 
"autopsychological" elements and primitive relations between 
them. In the system presented, the simple elements of 
experience are the "elementary experiences;~ i.e., the sense-
53Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, 
2d ed., trans. R. A. George (Berkeleyi Univ. of Calif. Press, 
1967), p. vi. 
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data of a particular pers(Jn i a."1.d primitive relation 
obtaining between them which is that of remembrance of 
. ·1 . 54 s1m1 ar1ty. 
In choosing a class of elements as the foundation 
of his constructir.m.al system, Carnap seriously considered 
two possibilities: a class of physical objects and a class 
of experiences. These al terna ti Vt?S cons ti tu te, respectively, 
the physical basis and the psychological basis for the epis-
temic structure. 55 As a basis, either the physical or the 
psychological is acceptable, in that a logical const~~ction 
of the world of things we know is possible on either. 
However, Carnap, in developing a logical schema of knowledge, 
wants to be as faithful as possible to the material conditions 
of human knowledge, in this case, to the ''epistemic primacy" 
of certain classes of possible basic elements over others. 
An element is epistemically primary to another element 
"if the second one is recognized through the mediation of 
the first." The choice of a psychological basis for the 
system is the result of first distinguishing two realms of 
psychological objects: the ~heteropsychological" and the 
"autopsychological." Following received opinion, Carnap 
writes thats 
••. the autopsychological objects are epistemically 
primary relative to the physical objects, while 
the heteropsychological objects are secondary. Thus, 
we shall construct the ph~rsical objects from the 
54Ibid., pp. 107-9. 
55Ibid., pp. 98-9. 
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a.u topsychological and the t~tel'C})Sychological 
from the physical objects.J) 
One Jr-nows physical objects by way of his own sensations 
(autopsychological elements) and the psychological ob-
jects of others (heteropsychologic~l elements) by way 
of physical objects (e.g., facial expressions, gestures, 
of possible brain states.) Thus Carnap embraces Hmethod-
ological solipsism" so as to keep his formal system similar 
to the syntheses of cognition as they occur in the actual 
process of thought. Although many had espoused the doctrine 
that all our knowledge is ultimately grounded upon simple 
sensation, Carnap's Logical Structure of the World represents 
the first major attempt to explicate the stru.cture of that 
knowledge. 
Carnap I s ''elementary experiences," equated with 
simple sense-experiences, appeared to many as likely can-
didates for the secure foundations of empirical lmowledge. 
As a criterion of the self-evident, Chisholm suggests that 
certain beliefs are self-evident whenever, in response to 
queries for justification, we may respond "What justifies me 
in counting it as evident that g is Fis simply the fact 
that g is F." 57 It makes good sense for the empiricist to 
ground his system of knowledge in the class of simple 
sense-experiences (no matter whether he analyzes these ad-
verbially or on the act-object model), for these experiences 
have traditionally been taken as indubitable; and the corres-
56rbid., pp. 88-94. 57Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge,p. 26. 
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ponding statements, incorrigible. If one is called upon to 
justify his asserting "I am having a red sense-experience" 
the best he can do is to make, as his justification, the 
same assertion. So the application of logicist methods to 
these primitive elements of experience appeared to mark a 
high point in the articulation of empiricist dogma. 
However, there were problems with the Logical-Positivist 
epistemic system. On the view of Carnap, Neurath, and other 
members of the Vienna Circle, human knowledge, and science in 
particular, insofar as it •is genuine, consists of a system of 
formation and transformation rules according to which state-
ments can be formulated and inferences made. In the nature 
of the case, non-linguistic elements cannot be part of a syn-
tactical system. Sensory experiences of human individuals 
cannot directly enter into the language of "unified science," 
as Carnap called it. In the formal analysis of language 
Wittgenstein "showed" in the Tractatus, the relation of the 
syntactical system to the facts comprising the world was ex-
plained by the structural . isomorphism between the elementary 
propositions and the atomic facts: "A proposition is a pic-
ture of realityH (4.01). The Logical Positivists, however, 
did not accept the picture theory of propositions and their 
relation to reality, considering it to be vague and metaphys-
ical. Characterizing this development, Carl Hempel reflected: 
If it is possible to cut off the relation to facts from 
Wittgenstein's theory and to characterize a certain class 
of statements as true atomic statements, one might perhaps 
maintain Wittgenstein's important ideas concerning state-
ments and their connections without further depending on 
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the fatal confrontation o~· staten cmts and facts . . . 
The desired class of propositions presented it-
self in the class of those statements ,·,hich express the 
result of a nure immediate experience witnout any 
theoretical ~ddition. They w~re called nrotocol 
statements, ang8were originally thought to need no further proof. 
Thus the truth of falsity, and with it the meaningfulness 
of empirical statements depends on the individual's protocol, 
which refers to a subjective experience. 
Science, once taken as the paradigm of objective 
knowledge, is shown to be radically subjective. Neurath found 
this result totally unacceptable, and set out to reconstrue 
the form of protocol-statements so as to maintain the ob-
jectivity, as well as the verifiability, of the scientific 
propositions derived from them. Neurath attempted to do 
this by taking as protocols factual statements of the same 
form as statements referring to physical objects or events, 
differing only in that, in them, a personal noun always 
occurs several times in a specific association with other 
terms. For example, a protocol statement might reads "Otto's 
protocol at Ji17 o'clock:[ At J:16 o'clock Otto said to 
himselfs (at J:15 o'clock there was a table in the room 
perceived bj Otto)] ." 59 The essential characteristic of a 
protocol is the occurrence, within the innermost brackets, 
of a personal noun and a term from the domain of perception 
58carl Hempel, "On the Logical Positivists' Theory of 
Truth," Analysis 2 (1935)1 51. 
59otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," trans. G. Schick, 
in A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (Glencoe, Ill.: The 
Free Press, 1959), u. 202. 
terms. For Neurath, every u1."'0tocol.. has a truth-value, and 
it is by reference to these basic staternentG that all state-
ments may ultimately be verified. The verification of a 
scientific, or any other kind of empirical statement, de-
pends upon the truth-values of the statements comprising 
the class of protocols. These statements, in the form 
Neurath gives them, are not statements directly referring 
to personal experiences: rather they are statements of 
intersubjective, publicly observable fact. 
Thus empirical knowledge finds an objective base. 
The upshot of this reconstrual of protocols is that in 
becoming ordinary empirical statements, they also became 
corrigible. Carnap, while Neurath was looking for a new 
kind of protocol, tried to maintain protocol statements 
as referring to immediate experiences by postulating the 
ultimate translatability of all statements of personal 
sense-experience into public empirical statements about 
brain states. 60 Yet this failed to satisfy Neurath, who 
held that the protocol statements must be integral com-
ponents of the syntactical structure of scientific knowledge, 
if inferences from them and verification by appeal to them 
was to be possible. The loss :of the base of subjective 
certitude for the knowledge structure did not bother 
Neurath. Indeed, unlike most members of the Vienna Circle, 
he believed that the true spirit of empirical scientific 
inquiry lay beyond the Machian positivism embodied in. -: 
60Rudolf Carnap, "Psychology in Physical Language," trans. 
G. Schick, in A. J. Ayer, ed. Logical Positivism, p. 197. 
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Carnaprs original constr1ctional system. No statement 
that can be accepted into t:-:c body of meaningful know-
ledge is absolutely incorrigible. 
Carnap finally adopted Neurath's "objectivism," 
abandoning the incorrigible personal sense-experience 
protocol as the basis of knowledge, But on the way to this 
viewpoint. he attem!)ted to maintain the connection. however 
tenuous, of subjective experience to protocol statements. 
Relying on the earlier distinction he had made in The 
Logical Structure of the World between knowledge of struc-
ture and experience of content, Carnap said that an ob-
jective system of propositions grounded in subjective 
experience is possible only because "even though the. 
material of the individual streams of experience is • . . 
altogether incomparable, ..• certain structural nroperties 
are analogous for all streams of experience. 1161 It is 
only with these general structural properties of experience 
that science is concerned. Later, Carnan further at-
tenuated the relation of protocols to subjective ex-
perience by suggesting that the assignment of truth or fal-
sity to a statement depends upon the protocols of the 
scientists of our "cultural circle." Carl Hempel took a 
similar course, defining the class of true protocols as those 
generally accepted in science. 62 
61 carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, p.107, 
62A. J. Ayer, "Verification and Experience," in 
A. J. Ayer, ed. Logical Positivism. pp. 230-1. 
But it appears th a~ ~v·en the ~llly physicalist des-
crintion of nrotocols still t5.es ob5ective science to sub-
..:. ... :.J 
jective experience. A. J. Ayer writes that he wonders why 
Carnap and Hempel pay so mu~h attention to protocol propo-
sitions, inasw1ch as the only distinction which they are able 
to draw between them and other propositions is a distinction 
of form.63 Why should a certain form of statement containing 
a personal pronoun or referring to a group of observers be 
chosen as the final verifier of factual statements if personal 
observation need not enter into objective knowledge? 
Neurath, adapting Carnap's principle of tolerance, wrote 
that "there is no way of taking conclusively established pure 
protocols as the starting point of the sciences." The type 
of proposition we introduce as the "simple" in the syntactic-
al system of knowledge is a matter of convenience, convention, 
and decision. Whatever class of statements are to be accept-
ed as the final verifiers, none of these can be taken as 
absolutely incorrigible. "We also allow for the possibility 
of discarding protocol sentences. A defining characteristic 
of a sentence is that it be subject to verification, that is 
to say, that it may be discarded." 64 
Karl Popper, an associate of the Vienna Circle, elab-
orates on the relativity of the protocol statements. He writes 
in his Logic of Scientific Discovery of what he calls the 
"psychologistic basis" of the traditional empiricist movement: 
that is, the grounding of knowledge in the experience of indi-
63rbid. 64Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," pp. 201-204. 
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vidual observers. Poprier tells us that Neurath 's view 
that protocol statements are not inviolable constitutes ''a 
step in the right direction" (i.e., away from subjectivism). 
However, the problem with basing public knowledge upon 
corrigible protocols is that it can lose contact with 
reality completely, becoming purely arbitrary. Neurath, 
Popper writes, fails to give any rules for deleting or 
accepting a given protocol statement and thus "unwittingly 
throws empiricism overboarct." 65 In the terminology of this 
essay, perception itself seemed to have lost all evidential 
status; and the selection of statements from which to con-
struct empirical knowledge claims becomes arbitrary. 
The severance of the language of empirical know-
ledge from immediate sense-experience on the part of Neurath, 
and later, Carnap, caused great alarm among other Logical 
Positivists. The quest for an objective base had col-
lapsed into a pure conventionalism, governed by con-
venience at best, or at worst by caprice. Schlick was a 
major voice within the logical-positivist camp against this 
move. Against what he considered the "relativism" of 
Neurath and Carnap, Schlick argues that the dissolution of 
the incorrigible bases of knowledge condemns one to a 
coherence theory of truth. Since the confrontation of the 
primitive propositions of science with the atomic facts of 
non-verbal reality has been disallowed, no such statement 
65Karl Popuer, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 
2d ed., (New YorkS Harper & Row,1968), p. 97 
is true or false because ;_;f its i:~or:-cespondence with the 
facts of the world. As we smv above, Karl Popper commented 
that, to avoid arbitrariness, Neurath needs to state a rule 
for the assignment of truth-values to the protocols. Like-
wise, Schlick writes that "'since no one dreams of holding 
the statements of a storybook true and those of a text·of 
physics false •.. something more must be added to co-
herence, namely, a principle in terms of which the com-
patibility is to be established, and this would alone then 
b th t 1 "+ • ~66 e _e ac ua cr1ver1on. 
Schlick singles out the principle of "economy'' s that 
is, the rule which says "we are to chose those as basic 
statements whose retention requires a mininrum of alteration 
in the whole system of statements in order to rid it of 
all contradictions. 0 It is this principle, he ways, which 
guides Neurath and Carnap in basing the system of scientific 
statements upon their freely selected protocols. However, 
Schlick contends that the principles of economy and co-
herence (or simply economy) cannot ultimately be adhered to, 
for "before one can apply the principle of economy one 
must know to which statements it is to be applied. ,,67 
Schlick contends that the final criterion by which any 
statement is to be accepted must involve that statement's 
origin. Thus the body of accepted statements constitutes 
66r.fori tz Schlick, "The Foundation of Knowledge," 
trans. D. Pynin, in A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism, p.216. 
67Ibid., p. 216-17. 
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all the statements of a parti~ular derivation and the 
questions of economy and/or coherence become super-
fluous or at least ancillary. Schlick's fina.l appeal is 
to the incorrigible status of those statements which ex-
press facts of one's own perception, originating in im~ 
mediate experience. 
The great deficiency of Ncurath's critical account of 
protocol statements, according to Schlick, lies in the 
fact that one's .Q:fill statements play the final and decisive 
role in determining the system of knowledge one holds. 
Indeed Neurath did not hold this opinion: he wrote that 
"the fact that men generally retain their own protocol 
statements more obstinately than they do those of other 
people is a historical accident which is of no real sig-
. f. ,,68 n1. 1.cance. He tells us that it makes no difference 
whether, in constructing the epistemic edifice, we utilize 
our own protocols or those of someone else. On this point, 
I think Neurath is essentially correct and that Schlick's 
contention is either true and trivial or simply mistaken. 
If all Schlick means is that the only way we come to know 
what other people's protocols are is by perceiving tokens 
of them (reading books: hearing speech) and that we could 
report these perceptual experiences in protocols of our 
own, then he is correct. However, if Schlick means to 
say that, in choosing between two protocols, one belonging 
to a trained scientific observer and one of my ovm making, 
68 . 
Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," p. 206. 
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I invariably choose my own, I cannot but see that Schlick 
is wrong. 
As a test case, let's consider the following situation. 
I am visiting an astronomer, a veteran observer of the 
heavens, and he :permits me to look at the planet Mars 
through his telescope. I put my eye to the eye-piece, see a 
red disc, and say "Ah yes, l'!,ars, 'the Red Planet• , '' where-
upon this perspicacious scientist tells me that I am mis-
taken; that the object I see through the telescope actually 
presents an orange appearance. Taking a second look, I see 
an orange disc. How do I respond? Quite naturally, I 
believe that the astronomer is correct, and that my fir~t 
observation was mistaken. I abandon my own observation 
statement. Now this is not the only course open to me. For 
I could say that I must have seen it to be orange and for-
got by the time I remarked on it or that I must have meant 
to call it orange but accidentally said 'red'. Or I 
could contend that, due to atmospheric conditions on the 
Earth or the planet's rapid rotation bringing an opposite 
hemisphere into view, the planet at first appeared to be 
red but now appears to be orange. On this "compromise" 
view, both of my protocols are true and the scientist is 
correct (at least for the present moment). Further, let 
us suppose that on my second look Mars had again appeared 
red, rather than orange. Perhaps I would hypothesize 
that Mars is of such a color that the disagreement is a 
matter of individual differences between observers' use 
• 
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of the color terms. irhe 2.zt~-:, t thi:-1,:: I want to do is to 
contradict the astronomer on this point. Schlj_ck main-
tains that "uncier no circumstances would I abandon my m,m 
observation statement."69 But, abandoning my observation 
statement is my first reaction, although I have other pos-
sibilities. I will grant the point that someone may 
stubbornly hold to the truth of ever-y protocol he has ever 
uttered, and as Schlick suggests, accept only a system of 
knowledge into which the entire class of his protocols 
fits unmutilated. It is certainly true that someone could 
do this. Of course, if someone did this obstinately enough 
and systematically enough he would be thought insane by 
the rest of us. 
Schlick is mistaken in his contention that the only 
way a pure coherence-conventionalism can be avoided is to 
ground scientific knowledge in incorrigible protocols de-
noting personal sense-experiences. The source of his error 
is, in retrospect, a simple but fundamental confusion of 
two different things. Discovering a class of what he considers 
incorrigibles, Schlick assumes that these statements alone can 
be the basis of knowledge. What kind or statements, on 
Schlick's view, might these protocols be? He tells us that 
they are the observation statements of individuals such as 
the reports "Here two black points coincide," "Here yellow 
borders on blue," "Here now pain."?O The essential feature 
69schlick, "The Foundations of Knowledge," p. 218. 
?Oibid. , p. 219. 
49 
of aYJ.y such incorrigiblt:: ·;:,r-1.itocoJ i.s that it contains a 
demonstrative term which has the function of a present 
"gesture~ toward something observed. There are two things 
that such ostensive statements can refer to. They can 
point to sense-data, that is, to elements of the world 
which are unlike physical objects although existing in-
dependently of the mind and are the objects of sensation. 
On the other hand, these protocols might be referring to 
modes of one's individual consciousness. These inter-
pretations correspond, respectively, to the act-object 
analysis and the adverbial analysis of perception. 
On the supposition that Schlick accepts an act-
object analysis of perceiving, I wonder of what value his 
introduction of demonstrative terms into the protocols 
is. For on this view the subjective protocols are no 
more than statements asserting the existence of certain 
sense-data. And since the sense-datum is an objective 
constituent of the physical world, rather than a mental 
entity, the protocol is a statement of empirical fact, 
and like all other statements in the "physicalistic" 
language of science, open to verification or to abandonment. 
Thus the difference between the physicalistic protocols 
proposed by Neurath and Carnap, and the sense-experience 
basic statements espoused by Schlick, is not the difference 
between corrigible statements and incorrigible statements, 
but simply a difference of variety of extra-mental entity 
denoted. Alternatively, Schlick's protocols may be thought 
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of as reports of an indiv5.1'J.al's introspection. The object 
of such introspection is, as I have already maintained, no 
constituent of the external world but simply according to 
what Hintrospection" meru1s, a state of affairs in one's mind; 
in this case, a specific mode of the sensory affection of 
consciousness. Although it is not universally accepted that 
intros~ection yields certainty, I grailt Schlick and any other 
defender of the sure foundation of lrnowledge that point for 
the present. So Schlick is justified in his exclamation: 
"What I see, I seet '' but only if by "seeH he means introspec-
tive awareness of a specific ocular modification of one's 
consciousness. If one "sees blue(ly) .. there is no sense in 
doubting the truth of the corresponding protocol as long as 
the assertion is restricted to being just what it is-- a re-
port of introspection. To apply the "What I see, I see~ 
dictum to perception, rather than to introspection, is thor-
oughlyunacceptable. Even a protocol so restricted as "I see 
something blue" is defeasible. It may well be the case 
(though it isn't the case very often) that there is no blue 
thing external to me; perhaps there is nothing there at all. 
Returning to my example of the astronomical observa-
tion, we should note that one's rescinding his earlier proto-
col does not constitute the admission that one was mistaken 
about his "sensing redly." The "I was wrong on my first ob-
servation" reaction contains not a complete dismissal of an 
experience, but a reclassification of it. In the first case 
I experienced a particular state of sensory consciousness, 
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introspected that state of r:;ind, r--... n:-: denoted it informally 
in the protocol. When I made the second observation I 
experienced a different mode of sensory consciousness, 
introspected it, and reported it in a new protocol. As 
far as my mental state is concerned, the two experiences, 
introspections, and uttered protocols are quite similar. 
The difference between these two events is that one of 
them is a perception (with the introspective awareness of 
it): an awareness of certain features of the external world, 
while the other is not, but only a particular mental event 
(with introspective awareness of that event). This latter 
kind of event we may call a sensation, but only guardedly, 
keeping in mind that we do not mean awareness of the 
external world by way of the five senses as species of 
Perceiving. Statements of the second type, if we were to 
assume the certainty of introspections, are indefeasible. 
Statements of the first type--perceptual protocols--are 
always defeasible. Given a.ny particular instance of sen-
sory awareness we may report it in either of these two kinds 
of protocols: e.g., 
(1) I am having an orange-sensation. 
(2) I perceive something that is orange. 
But I think the adverbial form of expression is superior 
to this in that it makes the difference more apparent. 
(1) becomes• 
(3) I sense 'orangely'. 
The adverbial analysis lets sensations be sensations, i.e., 
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modifications of the 
. ., 
mine., and perceptions be perceptions, 
i.e., knowledge of physical objects. In determining what 
kind of statement is to be admitted into the epistemic 
system as its basic element, it is essential that the dif-
ference between perception protocols and sensation protocols 
be clearly deliniated. 
Schlick was systematically ambiguous in his treatment 
of these two kinds of protocol sentence. He writes that 
those statements which ought to be accepted as protocols 
since they are free of all doubt, are uthose that express 
the facts of one's own 'perception', or whatever you like 
to call it." 71 There is no point in arguing about the uses 
of the terms, but it is significant that Schlick fails to 
make the essential distinction. In so far as Schlick wants 
incorrigible protocols, statements that express immediate 
facts of introspective knowledge of sensations do the 
job. When, to avoid the coherence theory of truth and 
subjectivism, he calls for statements that refer to the 
real, extra mental world, perception protocols fulfill 
his need. But no statement can fulfill both criteria. 
Incorrigibility is reserved for those synthetic statements 
which are self-evident. Reference to the public domain 
is only found in corrigible statements. 
Popper's view of what I have designated the sensation-
protocols is illuminating at this point. Statements about 
personal experiences are not suitable ustopping places" in 
?i Ibid. , u. 225. 
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our attemnt to test uhysical theories, for they cannot be 
tested. 72 Their incorrigibility renders them useless to 
science. Such statements Popper refers to as ''metaphysical" 
. . l '73 or non-empirica .. They do not enter into empirical know-
ledge; we may ignore them, since their very incorrigibility, 
or unfalsifiability in principle, renders them useless for 
grounding true empirical knowledge-claims. Genuine empirical 
knowledge is testable and subject to falsification by the 
community of trained observers. 
Nelson Goodman argues that personal sensory-experience 
reports are not incorrigible, for "judgements concerning 
immediate phenomena may be rejected in favor of judge-
ments concerning physical objects." 74 An example of such 
an abandonment of a sense-experience report I have already 
given in the case of seeing Mars through the telescope. 
Again, I think that the rather fundamental distinction be-
tween sensation and perception resolves the difficulty of 
the incorrigibility of the statements which may be adopted 
as the foundation of empirical knowledge. Goodman is correct 
in ~ointing out that we often do, in a sense, abandon or 
reject a protocol due to its incompatibility with other 
nrotocols or other kinds of statements. But this rejection, 
it seems to me, is a decision on the part of the observer 
72Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. p.105. 
?Jibid. , p. 69. 
74Nelson Goodman, "Sense and Certainty," in Problems 
and Projects (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), p. 61. 
54 
to reclassify a particular report as a sensation report 
rather than as a perception report. Such reclassification 
reminds one of the Critical Realists' "wild sense-datum," 
differing from a genuine object of perception only in its 
relation or lack or relation to other sense-data. 75 Al-
though we may decide that we were wrong in thinking we had 
a particular uerception, the original judgement is done 
away with in the sense that we forget about it and are no 
longer interested in it. We lose interest in it for what we 
are looking for is knowledge about our environment, not 
about our ovm mental states. The abandonment of a sensation 
once mistaken for a perception resembles the forsaking of 
a belief once mistaken for knowledge. 
The difference between a mental event being merely 
a sensation and being a perception lies not in any intrinsic 
character of the event but of the event's relation, or lack 
of it, to the external world. This relation and thus the 
truth or falsity of any perception protocol, is a matter of 
public, testable, empirical fact. An ''I perceive H . . . 
protocol is an assertion of an objective relation between 
one of my subjective mental states and the objective world. 
The epistemic system is founded uuon references to the real 
world, but those references are always open to public scrutiny. 
The question with which I am concerned is that of the 
relation of sensation-reporting statements to perception-
75R. J. Hirst, The Problems of Percention (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1959), p. 39.-
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reporting statements; p~rticularly w~.th the extent to which a 
critical introspe;ctive appraisal of sensation can warrant 
the corrE:sponding perceptual reports. However, before 
approaching that problem, we should note that it has been 
argued that not only perception protocols, but even sen-
sation protocols, are corrigible. Here I will adumbrate two 
lines of argunent against their incorrigibility. 
The first argument brought against the common-sense 
view that introspective knowledge is incorrigible is that 
introspection, and thus any sensation-reporting protocol 
involves the faculty of memory. One proponent of the view, 
Bruce Aune, writes that: 
The admission that memory is intrinsically fallible 
is, however, extremely damaging to the idea that phen-
omenal identifications could not possibly go wrong. 
There is plainly a sense in which memory is involved 
in all judgments of identification. To judge that a 
phenomenal occurrence has the property Fis to assert 
that it belongs to the class of F's, that the property 
it has is just the property that is nossessed by other 
F's. But how could one know this infallibly, if one's 
memory is intrinsically fallible?--if one may well 
misremember the peculiarities, the distinguishing 
£eatures, of F's generally?76 
This . sceptical attitude dates back to C. S. Peirce who writes 
that direct experience affirms nothing--it simply iss it 
involves no error because it testifies to nothing but its 
own existence. But "when it comes to be criticized it is 
past, itself, and is represented by memory. 1177 William James 
76Bruce Aune, Knowledge, .Mind, and Nature (New Yorks 
Random House, 1967) , _pp. 3.5- . 
77c. S. Peirce, "The Scientific Attitude and 
Fallibilism," in J. Buchler, ed. Philosonhical Writings of 
Peirce (New Yorks Dover, 195.5), pp. 57-8. 
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also found the introspec t ion of one's own mental states 
to be fallible. He writes: 
Even the writers who insist upon the absolute 
veracity of our i~mediate inner apprehension of a 
conscious state have to contrast with this the fal-
libility of our memory or observation of it, a 
moment later ... the nsychologist must not only 
have his mental states in their absolute veritable-
ness, he must report them . . . name them, classify 
and comnare them and trace their relations to other 
things~ .. And as in the naming, classing, and 
knowing of things in general we are notoriously 
fallible, why not also here?78 
The most forceful statement of this difficulty is found 
in the work of Anthony Quinton, who writes: 
•.. the more we seek to nrotect sense-statements by 
cutting them off logiqally· from other beliefs that 
might count against them the less they can be conceived 
as doing .... If they [the defenders of incor-
rigibility] insist on the fallibility of memory, 
sense-statements can have ... an instantaneous 
and evidentially wholly infertile kind of incor-
rigibility. If they do insist on it they cannot 
maintain that where there is an inconsistency 
between a sense-statement, the recollection of an 
immediately· previous statement and a recollection 
of identity of apparent ,earacter one of the latter 
must always be rejected. · 
If it is the case that a sensation-reporting protocol is 
dependent on memory, and if memory is inherently fallible, 
it follows that such protocols are not incorrigible. 
A more radical argument against the incorrigibility 
of subjective sense-protocols is the fact that the iden-
tification of sense particulars is only possible by the 
emnloyment of a conceptual apparatus within which, sub-
78william James, The Princinles of Psychology 
2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1950), 1: 189-90. 
79Anthony Quinton, The Nature of Things (London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 167-8, 
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jective exnerience can become knowledge. Wittgenstain's 
famous "private language'' argument (Philosophical In-
vestigations, 258) is the foremost example of this type 
of criticism. Here the correct identification of a sen-
sation, which is presupposed in any protocols' being able 
to be true or false, is only possible by the application of 
the intersubjective meaning-rules of a public language. 
Another variety of this style of argument is the contention 
that there is no such thing as a purely subjective sen-
sation-reporting protocol. This was maintained by Peirce, 
and later by other pragmatists, who held that the ascrip-
tion of any quality to a subject immediately involves one 
in the application of a general law and a ~rediction 
directed toward one's future experiences. 8° Karl Popper 
maintains an essentially similar view. He writes that even 
the simplest sensations are "theory-impregnated,'' adaptive 
reactions, and therefore, interpretations which are rife 
with conjectural expectations. Further, there can be no 
pure protocol language, for a language incorporates theories 
and myths. 81 
W. V. 0. Quine has argued that the attempt to 
ground empirical knowledge in subjective sensory experiences 
is misguided, ''Entification begins at arm's length; the 
points of condensation in the primordial conceptual scheme 
80Peirce, ''Perceutual .Judgements," in J. Buchler, ed. 
Philosophical Writings of Peirce, pp. J02-J. 
BL,,. l p i\.ar. onuer, 
1 9 7 2 ) , p • 14 5 . ·--
Objective Knov!ledge (Oxford: Clarendon, 
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P.? 
are things glimpsed, not glir:1pses. '' · ,__ The semantics of 
ordinary language direct our attentien to middle-sized, 
relatively nearby·, slow moving, physical objects. 83 Any 
:~mre protocol language nrust be derived from the everyday 
language used to describe the world of material objects 
and thereby, to one degree or another, is bound to the 
theoretical commitments of ordinary language and subject 
to its failings and to the possibility of its misuse. 
Whether sensation-reporting protocols are defeasible 
or not is a question I will not pursue here. I have merely 
shown that their incorrigibility is open to some doubt. 
Whatever the case, the problem now open before us is that 
of the relation of statements renorting introspective a-
wareness sensations to statements reporting introspective 
awareness of perception. As pointed out earlier, although 
Neurath and others attempted to introduce physicalistic 
nrotocols supposedly connected to personal sense-experience 
only out of convenience, that relation seemed to be necessary 
if the empirical knowledge structure is to have any connection 
to reality. Popper, who dismissed Neurath's protocols as 
nsychologistic, introduced the class of what he called 
''basic statements" which are singular ex~stential state-
ments. It is statements of this class which can contradict 
a theory and thus, on Popper's view, if they are repeatable, 
82w. V. O. Quine, Word and Ob.iect (Cambridger MIT 
Press, 1960), n. 1. 
83w. V. 0. Quine, Ontological Relativity (New Yorks 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1969), p. 1. 
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refute one theory in favor of an,Tther and direct us toward 
genuine emnirical knowledge. Popper adds that the basic 
statements must satisfy the material requirement of refer-
ring to observable events. Maintaining that though it 
may appear that he has reintroduced subjective sensation 
reports, Popper says that while observations and percep-
tions may be psychological, observability is not. Ob-
servability he hopes to introduce as a pd.mi tive epis-
84 
temological term. Popper tells us that his basic 
statements are in principle translatable into purely ob-
,jective statements, for we may stipulate "that every basic 
statement must either be itself a statement about relative 
positions of physical bodies, or that it must be equivelant 
to some basic statement of this 'mechanistic' or'material-
l.·sti·c• ki"nd. 85 n h P h d t ·d th ~er aps opper as manage o avoi e 
direct admission of subjective sensation or perception 
reports into the epistemic structure, but his attempt to 
designate observability as an undefined concept fails to 
hide the relation that science (as paradigmatic empirical 
knowledge) has to the world we know perceptually. Empirical 
knowledge is, let us suppose, based upon a class of basic 
statements . .Every statement of the system is meaningful 
in so far as it is truth-functional of these statements. 
These basic statements, the atomic propositions of the 
language of science, must in turn have truth-values. Surely, 
84 Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery,pp. 100-J. 
85I . OJ bid., p. 1 . 
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these statements may be "'-::;signed ·1.:r:.1 th-values in any 
number of ways--by me1~e caprice, by fJ.i-oping a coin, or 
whatever. Although the truth-value of such a statement may 
be determined in any of various ways, unless it is es-
tablished by the personal sensory or perceptual experience 
of individuals, that statement is of no value in our attempt 
to gain knowledge about the empirical world. An epis--
temic system my be contrived in which the basic statements 
are true or false according to, e.g., coin tosses, but 
such a system will never constitute empirical knowledge. 
Popper chooses the most basic class of public state-
ments for their testability and draws a line between these 
and phenomenal reports, calling the later metaphysical. 
But what is the relation? What are the "metaphysical 
foundations" of science? I contend, in the next chapter 
of this thesis, that emuirical knowledge does have foun-
dations, but that the inferential structure by which they 
support empirical knowledge claims is more complex than 
we may first sup~ose and stands in need of explication. 
CHAPTER III 
THE WARRANT-STATEftENT ANALYSIS 
The problem of determining whether and how subjective 
phenomenal beliefs provide evidence for, 01~ warrant, beliefs 
about things in the external world is an old one. John 
Locke wrote: 
There can be nothing more certain than that the idea 
we receive from an external ob.ject is in our minds: 
this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be 
anything more than barely that idea in our minds; 
whether we can thence certainly infer the existence 
of anything without us, which corresponds to that idea, 
is that whereof some men think there may be a ques-
tion made; because men may have such ideas in their 
minds, when ng
6
such thing exists, no obj~ct affects 
their senses. 
While Locke was sure that the external origin of "ideas 
of perception" is provided by an evidence that, though not 
apodictic, :outs us beyond doubting, Kant saw the problem 
as more urgent and wrote that: 
It still remains a scandal to philosophy and to ~, 
human reason in general that the existence of things 
outside us ... must be accepted merely on faith, 
and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their exis-
tence, we are unablB to counter his doubts by any 
satisfactory proof. 7 
Although we may have no interest in refuting the claims of 
86John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
collated and annotated by A. W. Fraser, 2 vols. (New York: 
Dover Press, 1959), vol. 2, pp. 185-6. 
87rrnmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. J4. 
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knowledge may still interest us, if only because it may 
throw some light on the general problem of the nature of 
knowledge. 
In the nrevious chanter we found that the attempt 
to ground knowledge of physieal objects in the immediate 
data of sense found itself forced to choose between sub-
jectivism and dubitability. Worse, the choice to build upon 
subjective experience so as to guarantee certainty may 
have come to nothing; many have held that no experience 
can be certain. Further, the decision to start with an 
intersubjective base may, as we noted, have failed to ex-
tricate itself from the subjective. The difficulties 
encountered in the logical reconstruction of the epistemic 
stn1cture from a particular class of protocol statements 
has led to a concern for a more careful analysis, not so 
much of the formal structure of knowledge, as of the evidential 
relations among the epistemic concepts embodied in ordinary 
discourse. r..rhe evidential, or warranting, character of 
various epistemic locutions has been the theme of an e~-
tended analysis carried out by Roderick Chisholm in a series 
of books and articles dating from the late 1940's almost to 
the present. It is to this analysis, and the problems in it, 
that I now turn my attention. 
The concept of evidence enters our epistemological 
discussion in three general ways. We may say that a belief 
is "evidenced," or warranted by another proposition or belief. 
'I'hese three categories may overlau. Thus a statement may 
be evident itself while warranting some other statement. 
In this case we say that the first statement confers 
evidence upon the second statement, and distinguish the 
evidential status of the two nrouositions, referring to 
the first as directly evident and the other as indirectly 
evident. The relation in which we are interested is the 
way in which directly evident perceptual beliefs may 
warrant other perceptual beliefs. So we are still dealing 
with the fundamental euistemic strucu1re of basis under-
lying inferred superstructure. However, the task that now 
lies before us differs fundamentally from the phenomenalist 
and physicalist programs for the epistemic construct in that 
we are investigating the inferential natterns of epistemic, 
rather than inductive, logic. 
Early in his investigation of the structure of 
empirical knowledge Chisholm questioned the basic contention 
of the constructionalist theories, i.e., the 11translatability 
theory," which states that any physical thing statement en-
tails a group of purely phenomenal statements. However, 
due to the facts of "perceptual relativity'' it - appears that 
only in conjunction with another thing statement referring 
to observation condi ticms can a statement such as "This is 
red" entail "Redness will appear" only in con.junction with 
a statement describing external conditions such as: 
This is observed under normal conditions; and if 
this is red and is observecl under normal conditions, 
redness will appear.BB 
The difficulty arises when a different statement of ob-
servation conditions obtains, such as: 
This is observed under conditions which are normal 
exceot for the nresence of blue lights; and if this 
is red and is observed under conditions which are 
normal exce1)t for the 
8
presence of blue lights, red-
ness will not appear. 9 
Appealing to ordinary usage, Chisholm tells us that the 
second observation conditions statement is consistent with 
the phenomenal statement "This is red" and therefore, the 
conjunction of "This is red" and the second observation 
conditions statement is consistent with the falsity of 
the phenomenal statement "Redness will appear." So the 
physical object statement does not entail the ~henomenal 
statement.9° 
rhat the relation of phenomenal to physical object 
statements is contingent is also the point of the traditional 
sceptical argument which states that where S stands for the 
predicate .,is a subjective sensory event," P stands for 
the predicate "is preceded by a corresponding physical 
event," and 1\1 is the modal operator for possibility, 
( x) ( S x M - Px ) . 
The denial of this proposition is the proposition 
( 3 x) ( Sx . LPx), 
where Lis the necessity operator. It is highly doubtful 
88Roderick Chisholm, "The Problem of Empiricism" in 
Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, Robert J. Swartz, ed. 
{Garden City, NY: 1963T:° n. 349. 
89rbid. 90Ibid., pp. 349-50. 
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whether a.viyone would hold this :proposition; to do so is 
to believe that there is an instance in which a nhenomenal 
state is necessarily linked to the physical world. 91 
The failure to show that the relation between phenom-
enal statements and physical thing statements is one of 
entailment necessitates an alternative account of the man-
ner in which subjective sense-experience may be said to 
justify lmowledge of physical things. 92 If perceptual 
statements referring to physical things are to be justified, 
they will be justified by their evidential status, not by 
any necessary connection to subjective states. 
Chisholm's first approach to the problem remains 
parallel to the traditional empiricist attempt to ground 
lmowledge of physical things in immediate sense-experience. 
He writ~s that if we consider any perceptual knowledge 
claim such as: 
(Pl) That is Mt. Monadnock behind the trees, 
and ask how we would justify this statement if called upon 
to do so the following structure comes into view. Under-
lying the perceptual claim are two different kinds of 
statements; one is a second, more limited perceptual claim 
and the other is a statement of independent information. 
For example, to justify (1) one might say, 
(P2) I see a high mountain with a cabin near the top, 
91Richard L. Purtill, Logic fo~ Philosophers (New Yorks 
Harper and Row, 1971), u. 267, 
92Chisholm, "The Problems of Empiricism" p. 353. 
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a _justifying perceptual state ment . and add: 
(I1) There is no other mountain like that anywhere 
near here, 
thus stating inde~endent information. The second percep-
tual statement could in turn be justified by a perceptual 
statement in conjunction with an independent information 
statement, and the justification process could continue, 
in principle, either indefinitely or until a perceptual 
statement is reached which cannot be justified by any lower 
level statements. 9J 
It is this line of thought, following such an 
imaginary series of requests for the justification of a 
perceptual claim, which has been the basis of empiricist 
thought. Traditionally, the points at which the inverted 
tree of perceptual justification must stop branching have 
been held to be perceptual knowledge claims which one 
cannot justify by appeal to anything beyond themselves. 
Such statements are reports of immediate, subjective 
sense-experiences, the role of which was discussed in the 
second part of the thesis where we found that the attempt 
to integrate them, as the class of protocol statements, into 
the inferential system of empirical knowledge was problematic. 
In the paper's first part I tried to show that the attempt 
to immediately infer the existence of extra-mental entities 
from such statements resulted from an erroneous analysis of 
them. Here I follow the attempt to construe the warranting 
93Roderick Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosonhical Study 
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 55-8. 
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relation between the£;e stat,2ments ar"!.:1 other (perceptual) 
statements. Chisholm points out that, in its most radical 
form, empiricism can be thou(;ht of as the belief that only 
phenomenal beliefs, which on the adverbial analysis of 
sensation would take the form, e.g., "I am appeared to 
redly'' are evident and that only these statements can con-
fer evidence on other statements. 
Prefatory to considering the "emoirical criterion" 
for evidence, Chisholm tries to ascer~ain a general set of 
criteria for the "marks of evidence.'' He suggests that 
"whenever a man has adequate evidence for some proposition 
or hY1)othesis, he is in a state which constitutes a mark 
of evidence for that proposition or hypothesis. 94 By 
looking at such paradigm cases we may ascertain the marks 
of evidence. To determine which propositions are evident 
we nrust have a criterion for the marks of evidence. The 
discovery of such a criterion constitutes one solution to 
the problem of the cri+.erion of knowledge I referred to in 
part two. When do we have the marks of evidence? When 
might a knower apply the locution "I have evidence for the 
proposition h 11 ?95 Chisholm gives us three marks of evidence 
which constitute a set of criteria such that if a proposition 
satisfies them, we may properly call that proposition evident. 
The first mark is epistemic neutrality; that is, if someone 
91-t, • • Roderick Chisholm, "'Ap~ear,' 'Take,' 'Evident,'" 
in Perceiving, Sensirn?;, and Knowinq:, Robert J. Swartz, ed. 
(Garden City, NYi Doubleday, 1965), p. 476. 
95Ibid. 
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is in an evidence-making stc:..,:e, he c ·:::.n Jescribe that state 
without using e i,)istemic terms. This criterion safeguards the 
person claiming to know an evident proposition from the charge 
of circularity 
The second mark of evidence is that the subject be in 
a condition such that he cannot be mistaken about being in 
that state while he is in it~ neither could he falsely believe 
that he is in that state when he is not actually in it. This 
second criterion runs up against the problem of the supposed 
incorrigibility of introspective knowledge claims. But 
Chisholm qualifies this criterion by writing that it may be 
taken in either of two ways. In the first of these, in order 
to avoid somt=! of the difficulties of claiming that a synthet-
ic statement is certain, we may say that statements describing 
such states are not the kind of statement to which we can 
meaningfully apply the terms certain and uncertain. Rather 
than say that, e.g., "I sense bluely" is certain, we might 
contend that it makes no sense to say that it can express 
error or mistake.9 6 By analogy, such statements are epistem-
ically "innocent," and cannot have "righteousness" or "sin" 
meaninfully a.scribed to them. 
The second method by which Chisholm's second mark of 
evidence may be saved from ascribing epistemic incorrigibil-
ity to sense-experience reports is that of reformulating the 
definition of certainty. Rather than taking certainty or 
incorrigibility as a feature of the statement itself, Chisholm 
96chisholm, Perceiving, p. 65. 
defines it in terms o:f the r e lat5.o :1.G bet ween s -;;ates of mind. 
In Perceiving he writes that" 'sis certain that his true' 
mea.'1.S ( i) S lmows that h is true and (ii) th .ere is no hypoth-
esis i such that i is more worthy of S's belief than h. 1197 
Later, in the formalization of the Calculus of Epistemic 
Preferability, Chisholm and Keim present the following defin-
ition of certainty: 
CTh = df {Bh P Wh) & Bh S B(h/\-h), 
which conjoins the statement that his "beyond reasonable 
doubt," previously defined ass 
Rh= df Bh P Wh, 
(which states that believing his epistemically preferable to 
witholding h) with the statement that believing h has the same 
epistemic value as believing the tautology h" -h. The rela-
tion "having the ~ame epistemic value" Chisholm and Keim define 
ass 
pSq = df -(pPq) & -(qPp).98 
Thus "being certain" means being in a state described by the 
preferential relations obtaining among one's ovm beliefs. I 
shall return to this point, but it will now suffice to show 
that the intent of defining certainty in terms of worthiness 
of belief or epistemic preferability, i.e., in terms of our 
belief-structures, is the avoidance of attributing certainty 
to the propositions believed. 
9? Ibid • , p • 1 9 . 
98Roderick Chisholm and Robert G. Keim, "A System of 
Epistemic Logic," Ratio 15 (1972), pp. 101-2, 114. -
Chisholm's third ~ar~ of "for any subject S, 
that S has adequate evidence for :-"3. givc,n :proposition ... h, 
would be a state or condi~icn such that, whenever Sis in 
that state or condition, S has adequate e\ridence for h. 1199 
Now the ernpirica,l criterion mast, if it is to be ac-
ceptable, satisfy the three criteria. Does the state taken by 
empiricism to be evidence-making, i.e., the condition of an 
individual undergoing a sense-experience, have the three 
required marks of evidence? It appears that it may. A state-
ment such as "I am appeared to redly" contains no epistemic 
term and thus fulfills the first requirement. Such a state-
ment also meets the second criterion, since in making a sense-
experience report it is impossible to be mistaken (if we grant 
Chisholm his analysis of "being certain"). Neither could 
one(on the same assumption) be mistaken and report that he was 
having a particular sensation when, in fact, he was not. If 
the empirical criterion of evidence satisfies the criteria 
for marks of evidence we may yet ask whether that criterion 
is adequate for the warranting of physical object statements. 
We found that when we start justifying our perceptual 
claims we bring in supporting pairs of statements, one percep-
tual statement and one statement of empirical information. 
Finally, we reach a kind of claim which requires no eviden-
t-ial basis other than itself. This variety of statement 
Chisholm calls the directly evident. Leibniz had called them 
"primary truths of fact"; Meinong called them "self-presenting"; 
?1 
and Brentano referr,~d to th~ n; as i::1ner perceptions •100 
According to Curt Du.•~asse, they comprise the class of pro-
·t· h . "1. t ,. b 1· b 0 l 0 t "lOl posi ions aving u ti~a e u~ais e_ieva 1 1 y. And 
it was this kind of pro9osition that comprised the class of 
protocols from which the phenomenalists attempted to con-
struct the world of physical objects. But Chisholm 
finds this class of statements to be inadequate for the 
warranting of all the statements, following ordinary usage, 
we would take as evident. If we look at our perceptual 
justification structure, we find that as we approach the 
directly evident propositions the amount of information 
conveyed by the perceptual, as opposed to the independent 
information, statements decreases. Recognizing this feature 
of the \Vay in which we justify our perceptual claims, 
R. J. Fogelin has J1ointed out that this procedure actually 
contains t',no methods; the "method of dilution" and the 
"method of hedging." In the first method we proceed by 
making the description more and more inclusive and thereby 
cutting down on our chances of error. Finally we approach 
the_point of calling the thing a being and saying nothing 
about it. "Here incorrigibility and emptiness of des-
criptive content are approached as the same limit. 102 
In Sense and Sensibilia, John Austin illustrates the 
100 chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, p. 28. 
101 c. J. Ducasse, Truth, Knowledge, and Causation, 
(Londons Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968) pp. 173, 176-8. 
102 Robert J. Fogelin, rleanirtg and Evidence, (London a 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967). pp. 97-8. 
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method of hedging by pointinp~ out that one may ,.,ttempt 
to use the "minica.lly adv8ntu.rous" form of words j e.g., 
"There's a tiger--there seems to be a tiger--it seems to 
me that there':.:; a tiger--it seems to me now that there's 
a tiger--it seems to me nbw as if there were a tiger."lOJ 
The point to which these lead us is aptly put by Chisholm 
when he notes that when we reach this level of directly 
evident proposition we have dropped below the level of 
perception and are dealing only with sensations in the way 
in which I have used that term in part two. "Perceiving, 
as a way of knowing, seems to have disappeared" 104 s a con-
clusion which~ I might add, was foreshadowed above where 
we spoke of the "epistemic innocence" of the phenomenal 
statements. However, although the perceptual claims derive 
most of their support from the independent information state-
ments, some of that support still comes from perceptual 
statements, and finally, from the phenomenal sense-experience 
claims. 105 
Yet, agreeing with Hume, Chisholm believes that taken 
as our sole evidence criterion the empirical criterion leads 
us to a sceptical attitude with regard to knowledge claims 
about the external world. The empirical criterion is too 
narrow a base for the warranting of all the statements 
we would ordinarily regard as evident to us. Strict ad-
lOJJohn Austin, Sense and St:!nsibilia (Oxfords Oxford 
Univ. Press., 1962), p. 141. --
104chisholm, Perceiving, p. 70. 105 rbid. p. 71. 
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herence to the empirical criterion leads us into the 
follmving dilemma. If w'=. can make use only of the per-
ceptual side of the justification frame, specifically the 
phenomenal statements, we cannot suppcrt our upper level per-
ceptual claims, since ~henomenal statements do not entail 
physical ob:ject statements. Therefore, we can only justify 
our perceptual claims by using the phenomenal statements in 
probabilistic inferences, thereby connecting the physical 
thing superstructure to the directly evident basis. But 
we cannot even formulate a probabilistic inference without 
going beyond the empirical criterion, for there can be no 
inductive canon which will render the physical thing state-
ment probable in relation to the directly evident state-
ment which doesn't say something about physical objects 
as well as phenomena. The statement "Well .•• the thing 
looks blue. And ••• if the thing looks blue to me in 
this light, then, surely, it is blue." 106 Now this constitutes 
an: acceptable inductive argument, but if the general rule 
it contains: "if the thing looks blue to me in this light 
then, surely, it is blue" is an evident proposition, it can 
be so only on the basis of its being warranted by a phenom-
enal statement, and that connection must, in turn, be 
established by an inductive rule. It should be clear that· 
the attempt to render physical object statements probable, 
in relation to phenomenal statements leads to a regress of 
justification. To vary the terminology, we may say that no 
106 Ibid., p. 71. 
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statement of initial conditions is ad8quate, without a 
theory, to establish a prediction. And neither is such 
a statement adequate to develop a theory in the first place. 
Thus, the empirical criterion, taken by itself, locks 
us into the world of phenomena. 
To do justice to our ordinary belief that we do 
have knowledge and that that knowledge can be justified, 
Chisholm introduces a second criterion of evidence. Before 
explaining this criterion, I think it is worthwhile to note 
that it is Chisholm's senaration of the concepts of cer-
tainty and of the evident (actually, he construes the cer-
tain as a species of the evident) which enables him to 
formulate his second criterion of evidence. So long as 
the evident and the certain are identical, escape from 
some form of phenomenalism or scepticism seems impossible. 
Brentano, for example, made this identifications "What is 
evident cannot be in error . . . • 'It is evident to me' 
comes to the same thing as 'It is certain to me.,,,iO? 
On this strict view of the evident, according to which 
only "insights" and "inner perceptions" are evident, 
lower-level perceptual claims can support very little of 
the epistemic structure. 
Rejecting this more or less traditional view of 
what statements are warraT1ted, Chisholm introduces a second 
class of statements which he thinks will satisfy the marks of 
107 Franz Brentano, The T~ie and the Evident trans. 
R. Chisholm, Politzer & K. Fisher, mew Yorks Humanities 
Press, 1966), p. 126. 
evidence. This second ev~den~ial state is that called 
"perceptual taking." A perccntual taking occurs when these 
criteria are mets 
(i) x aoncars in some way to S 
(ii) s believes that Xis f 
(iii) S believes, with respect to one of the ways he is 
an~eared to, that he would not be apoeared to in 
th~t way, under the conditions which-now obtain, 
if x were not f; and S did not arrive at these 
beliefs as a result of deliberation, reflection1 
or inference.108 
That perceptual taking, so defined, meets the first two 
criteria for the marks of evidence is clear. But the prob-
lem comes when we ask whether perceptual takings meet the 
third requirement. Is it, in fact, the case that whenever 
someone takes something to have some characteristic he 
thereby has adequate evidence for the proposition that the 
thing does have that characteristic? If the taking criterion 
is acceptable as a mark of evidence we will certainly have 
warranted beliefs about the external world; perceptual claims 
like "I see a cat on the roof" will be justified, and thus 
scepticism will be refuted. 
However, it appears that the taking criterion is too 
wide, including cases in which we would not want to call 
a person's perceptual claims warranted. Throughout his 
writings, Chisholm has implicitly adopted a guide for the 
description of perceptual claims as warranted. We might 
say that an individual's belief is evident if it is such that 
if later events show it to be incorrect, we would still 
108chisholm, "'Appear,' 'Take,' 'Evident,"' p.48J. 
maintain that the belief was evident to the person holding 
it at the earlier time. If this is acceptable, unveridicial 
but evident takings are possible. Chisholm writes that our 
perceptual takings have a kind of "internal" justification, 
for most of them are veridicial. However, some of our 
takings are incorrect; in those cases a false proposition 
is evident and, by epistemic preferability, we ought to 
place our confidence in that false proposition. The case, 
Chisholm believes, is analogous to that of moral judge-
ments, in which we sometimes find that doing the right 
thing leads to wrong consequences. 109 
At first the taking criterion, which draws upon our 
faith in spontaneous perceptual belief and the trustworth-
iness of our perceptual mechanisms, looks as though it 
might be an acceptable criterion for the perceptually evident. 
But there are cases in which the taking criterion fails 
to satisfy the implicit requirement for the designation 
of propositions as evident. The following example is a 
case in which a taking, though having the three marks of 
evidence, would not properly be called evidents 
If a spectator feels certain that the defendant 
is the man-who is guilty, then, if he takes someone in 
the courtroom to be the defendant, he will, thereby, 
also take him to be the man who is guilty. For he 
will believe, with respect to the way he is ''appeared 
to," that he wouldn't be appeared to in that way 
under those conditions if the defendant
1
- 0the man he believes to be guilty--were not there.1 
The s~ectator does not have adequate evidence for believing 
109 Ibid., pp. 484-5. 110 ch· h 1 P .. is om, erceiving, p. 79. 
in the defendant's guilt. r_rhus the perceptual taking 
criterion is too wide. 
Perhaps what is needed is a restricted form of the 
taking criterion, Chisholm thus introduces the narrower 
class of "sensible : takings.'' Returning to the Mt. Monad-
nock example, let us consider the following sequence of 
perceptual claims: 
(1) I see that is f,'lt. Monadnock behind the trees. 
(2) I see that there is a blue cabin near the top. 
(3) I see that there is something there which is blue. 
(4) There is something that appears to me in the way in 
which blue things would appear under conditions 
like these. 
(5) There is sometht£¥ that appears blue to me. 
(6) I sense bluely. 
According to the empirical criterion, (1)--(5) are not 
themselves evident unless they have evidence conferred 
upon them by being probable in relation to (6), which is 
directly evident. So long as they express what the per-
ceiver believes, (1), (2) and (3) are evident on the per-
ceptual taking criterion. 112 
As a compromise between these two views Chisholm 
proposes that statements of kind (3) exemplify a class of 
evident statements. Such takings may be unveridicial, but 
still be evident in virtue of the informal criterion of 
evidence introduced above. For example, if a blue car is 
parked, at night~ under a certain kind of street lamp, it 
appears to be green. If someone, unaware of the effects 
111 "th t . 1 . 1 d"f" t· f Ch" h 1 wi ermino ogica mo 1 ica ions rom is om, 
Perceiving, pp. 81-2. 
112 Ch' h 1 P .. is om, .erceiving, p. 82. 
and/or proximity of the stre,?t larnpi "sensibly t? .kes" the car 
to be green, we may say that he has evidence for the propos-
ition "I see that there is something which is green,"113 
The class of sensible takings differs from the larger 
class of perceptual takings in that it is restricted to beliefs 
or statements about what Chisholm calls the "proper objects" 
of the various senses and the common sensibles, The proper 
objects of vision are colors; of hearing, the various sounds; 
of feeling, somesthetic characteristics such as rough, smooth, 
heavy, hard; of taste, gustatory characteristics such as frag-
rant, putrid, burned. The common sensibles are those percept-
ible characteristics belonging to no particular sensory fac-
ulty. Examples of common sensibles are movement, rest, num-
ber, and also such relations as resemblance, difference, 
larger than, faster than, before and after, and so on.114 
We have then an epistemic principle which states: 
If there is a certain sensible characteristic F such that 
S believes that he perceives something to be F, then it is 
evident to S that he is perceiving something to have that 
characteristic F, and also that there is something which 
is F.115 
Thus sensible taking adequately supports the knowledge one 
has about physical objects; put more accurately, the statement 
reporting a belief about one's ovm sensible taking warrants 
certain statements about the sensible characteristics of phys-
113 Ibid., pp. 86-7. 
114 Chisholm, 
115Ib"d ]. . ' p. 
Perceivi...ng, p. 87. 
47. 
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ical objects. But the evid0r.ce of' sensible talcings 
doesn't guarantee their accuracy. As Chisholm remarks 
with regard to the person who mistook the color of the car, 
though he is warranted in believing what he believes, "~ 
h . 116 may know e 1.s wrong." When restricted to the sensible 
characteristics, the spontaneous act of taking confers 
evidence and reasonability, 117 but not certainty. 
To ameliolate the taking criterion for those who 
draw back from the notion of unveridicial but evidential 
sensible takings, Chisholm differentiates "prima-facie" 
evidence from "absolute" evidence. We may say that a 
person has prima-facie evidence for a particular perceptual 
claim when his claim is evident relative to a certain body 
of information but is susceptible to being overthrown in 
light of a wider situation. The absolutely evident is 
that which is prima-facie evident, but is not overriden 
by information pertaining to a wider situation. 118 
Has Chisholm formulated an acceptable criterion 
for the evident? Even if one grants the possibility of 
unveridicial evidence, it may be that the sensible taking 
criterion endorses cases as evident when in fact we would 
not consider a belief warranted, and is therefore too broad 
116chisholm, Perceiving, p. 87. 
117Roderick Chisholm, "On the Nature of Empirical 
Evidence," in Chisholm and Swartz, ed., Emnirical Knowledge 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJs Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 245. 
118Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, p. 48. 
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and in need of further restri::~tions. 
Herbert Heidelberger raises the following objectioni 
If we have overwhelming evidence Rt a given time that an 
object is not yellow then the ~ronosition that that 
object is yellow is not prima- ·facie evident at that 
time, even though for some reason we retain our belief 
that we perceive it to be yellow. 
Heidelberger points out that to regard this proposition as 
prima-facie evident is to confuse a proposition's being 
evident with there being some evidence for it. To be 
prina-facie evident a proposition ITT~st not only have some 
warrant; but there must be no countervailing evidence. 119 
I think that Heidelberger is mistaken when he writes 
that a requirement of a statement's nrima-facie evidence 
is there being no countervailing evidence for that state-
ment's denial. This requisite involves us in all the 
difficulties which prevented us from justifying our per-
ceptual claims entirely by appeal to other perceptual 
claims. The requirement can only be satisfied by the 
introduction of information about the physical world, which 
in turn can only be justified by appeal to an established 
criterion of evidence. I suggest that the proper re-
quirement is not that there be no countervailing evidence, 
but that the person concerned have no such evidence. This 
criterion involves no reference to the individual's re-
lation to the external world, but only places a consistency 
requirement upon's one's beliefs. 
---------
119Herbert Heidelberger, "Chisholm's Epistemic 
Principles," Nous 3 (1969): 76. 
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Chisholm, in reuly to Heidelberger, supplies a crit-
erion for evidence which recognizes the need for the con~ 
sistency of one's beliefss 
Necessarily, for any Sat any t, if (i) Sat t 
believes himself to perceive something to be F, if 
(ii) there is no nronosition i such that i is evident 
to Sand such that the conjunction of i and the proposi-
tion that S believes himself to uerceive something to 
be F does not confirm the urouosition that he does then 
perceive something to be F~ a~d if (iii) the proposition 
that he does then perceive something to be Fis a 
member of a set of - concurrent nrono~itions each of 
which is beyond reasonable doubt ior Sat t, then the 
proposition that he does then perceive something to 
be F, as well as the proposition that somethin~ is, 
or was F, is one that is evident for Sat t.12v 
The idea of "set of concurrent propositions" introduced 
in part (iii) of this description of the necessary con-
ditions of perceptual evidence, simply refers to the 
further stipulation that the report of the sensible taking 
not stand in isolation, but be a member of a set of pro-
positions that are mutually consistent and logically 
independent of each other (no one logically implies 
another) and are such that each one is confirmed by the 
conjunction of all the rest. 121 
Part (ii) tells us that the individual's beliefs 
(which are, as beliefs, directly evident to him) do not 
cast doubt upon the perceptual claim. A proposition i 
would be the report of a taking such as · "r seem to remember 
my senses malfunctioning," "I believe that this is something 
120 Roderick Chisholm, "On the Nature of Empirical 
Evidence~" p. 249. 
121 Chisholm, Theory of ~nowledge, p. 53. 
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that does not appear to he its normal color in this light," 
or ( when the perceptua.: 1• claim is "I see something round 
here") "I feel sor.1ething square here.'' If the other con-
ditions obtain, and the sub.ject has no 1 evident to him, 
then the perceptual claim is prima-facie evident to him. 
One may object that we would tend to resist saying 
a person's perceptual claim was, at some time prima-facie 
evident to him if that person had evidence available to 
him that would, in conjunction with his sensible taking, 
fail to confirm his perceptual clair.i. This argument has 
only a superficial plausibility. If by evidence available 
to him we mean that he was in a position to have an i 
become evident to him but, due to his observational care-
lessness, he failed to come to know i, we can only critize 
the quality of his observational powers. It remains that 
no i was evident to him. But suppose that there is some 
proposition p evident to the subject and it happens that 
although p implies i, the subject is unaware of this im-
plication. Again, I think that we can only criticize 
the subject's ignorance of the implication, but we cannot 
regard his perceptual claim as unwarranted for him. For 
one who lmows that u imolies i, Pisani, but this would 
.J. .. - -
not be the case with the individual we are discussing. 
If a perceptual claim meets the stringent require-
ments for being prima-facie evident that I quoted above, I 
believe we may well consider it to be prima-facie evident. 
It may be that objections to these criteria are actually 
f;J 
objections to the orighi3.l distinction made between the 
evident and the certaiYi, and reflect an unwillinsness to 
allov; unveridic ial evidence. 
A great deal of the relevance of the foregoing ar-
guments lies in the well-knovm fact that sometimes, no matter 
what our beliefs, we are subject to various perceptual er-
rors. We may, perhaps, summarize Chisholm's handling of the 
problem of perceptual warranting as an attempt to maintain 
the thesis that we do have justified perceptual beliefs--
that we do, in fact, perceive-- in the face of the reality 
of these errors. Unfortunately, the fact of these errors 
is too often allowed to enter epistemological discussions in 
an unanalyzed state. 
Let• s return to an illustration of perceptual mis-
taking which we encountered as an example of unveridical 
sensible taking. This is the case of the blue car which, 
when parked under the street lamp, appeared green to the 
normal observer. Now one kind of perceptual error is 
that exemplified here, where the observer's error is the 
result of his making a perce~tual judgement on the basis of 
too narrow a range of information about the observation 
conditions. In the case in question, the observer had a 
green sensation--he sensed greenly--and his having that 
sense-experience is a result of his sensory mechanisms 
operating properly. Ironically, it is the proper function-
ing of the observer's sense organs and nervous system which 
led him to make the mistaken perceptual claim. The car's sur-
face was reflecting li t;h ;; of a gl"Sr::n wavelength and there-
by stimulating the observer so ·::.hat he did have a green 
sensation. The nerceptual 'nGchanism' s ability to dis-
cern the facts of the world, but only within a narrow, 
immediate range, can be the basis of perceptual mistakes 
unless coupled with an adequate supply of relevant in-
formation about observation conditions. 
If someone thinks that a stick seen through water 
is bent, or that at sunset the sun turns red and bloated, 
or that the train's whistle increases in frequency as it 
approaches him, his error is not due, in any straight for-
ward sense, to the failings of his perceptual apparatus. 
This person's problem cannot be alleviated by repairing his 
eyes, his optic nerves, or ocular or auditory regions of his 
brain. The trouble is that his senses are dutifully and 
busily providing him information about his immediate en-
vironment. The light reaching his ey~s from the setting 
sun is, as a constituent of the physical world in the ob-
server's immediate vicinity, exactly like the light that 
would emmanate from a huge red-orange globe hanging near 
the local horizon. And it is the same with the other cases. 
The observer is ignorant (if he is deceived) of particular 
features of the world that, as mediums in the three ex-
amples I gave above, or less directly as in the case of the 
car and the street lamp, interfere with the causal sequence 
that begins with the thing or event observed and terminates 
at the observer. But such causal interferences do have real 
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results In the ph,ysica1 wc:r1d tii2.t a.:.-e correctly reported 
by our propGrly functioning seDses. Our senses tell us 
exactly what frequency light and sound they receive, what 
configurations and patterns are presented to them: they 
do not ''cheat'' on the immediate facts of the world so 
as to keep us from falling into error. The avoidance 
of error is the job of the mind obtaining and using independent 
information about the observation conditions so as to take 
everything relevant into account before making judgements 
about the world nerceived. Unfortunately, we never seem to 
obtain all possible information about causal interferences 
and absolutely veridicial perceptual taking remains an 
unrealized possibility. 
Winston H. F. Barnes wrote thats 
it is an epistemological ideal that if we were to 
discover completely the nature of existing things, 
there would be nothing left in the modes of ap-
pearance which would not entirely harmonise with 
our sys~ 2m of knowledge and find its explanation there. 1 
Although I do not think that such a state of knowledge can, 
in principle, be reached, I do propose that the degree of 
warrant we may assign to our perceptual claims is functional-
ly related to the degree of comprehensiveness to which our 
independent information about observation conditions attains. 
Can we formulate a criterion according to which a perceptual 
claim is justified (warranted, prima-facie evident)? 
There is an analogous problem encountered by phil-
122 w. H. F. Barnes, "The Myth of Sense-Data," p. 155. 
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osophers of science. Carl Hempei considers an inconsistency 
that develops in the use of the commonly acce,ted statistical 
syllogism of the forms 
a is F 
The uronortion of F's that are G is g 
Hence, with probability q, a is G. 
Traditionally this kind of inference has been restricted to 
cases in which the reference class is finite. But the pro-
bability stated: 
p( G, F) = r 
tells us, on the frequency theory of probability, that the 
long-run relative frequency of outcome Gin some "random 
experiment" of kind Fis r. In cases where r is equal to 
or very close to 1.0, it is our tendency to say something 
likes "If an experiment of kind Fis performed just once 
it is practically inevitable that a result of kind G will 
ensue." This would perhaps authorize an inference of this 
forms 
a is F 
The statistical probability of an F to a G is very nearly 
1.0 
So, it is almost certain that a is F. 
But this kind of inference leads us into difficulties. Sup-
pose an argument assumes the following forms 
Peterson is a Swede. 
The 1Jroportion of Roman Catholic Swedes is less than 2% 
So, almost certainly, Peterson is not a Roman Catholic. 
Suppose that we then come across, 
Peterson made a pilgrimage to Lourdes. 
Less than 2% of those making pilgrimages to Lourdes are 
not Roman Catholics 
So, almost certainly, Peterson is a Roman Catholic. 
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The individual case 'a~ w:.11 br~J.,:,r.g to different reference 
classes (F 1 ,F 2 ..• ) whose members exhibit G with different 
relative frequencies. 123 lnduc~;i ·.re arguments must, it appears, 
be guided by what has been called the ''Requirement of Total 
Evidence" (RTE) if we are to use them rationally and avoid 
the inconsistencies due to multiple reference classes. 
Quoting Carnap, Hempel provides a tentative rendition of 
RTEs "In the application of inductive logic to a given know-
ledge situation, the total evidence must be taken as a basis 
for determining the degree of confirmation. 11124 
A RTE for perceptual warrant would state that the 
total evidence relevant to possible interferences in the 
causal process be taken into account in the formulating of 
any perceptual claim. And I think people do operate with 
some such tacit guide for the justification of one's in-
ference from phenomenal experiences to perceivings. If, 
ideally, the RTE had been satisfied, and the other criteria 
for perceptual taking met, an individual's perceptual claim 
would acquire absolute evidence. In all actual cases, the 
RTE enters our deliberations as an informal maxim which 
guides us in applying the rule, stated earlier, which says 
that an individual's perceptual claim is warranted if and 
only if an objective judge were to say that the belief 
was evident to the observer, and thus the observer had 
123 carl Hempel, "Inductive Inconsistencies" in Asuects of 
Scientific Explanation (New Yorks The Free Press, 1965), pp. 5If.:6. 
124Ibid., pp. 6J-4. 
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excellent reasons to m&k.B t}·!e p :n·ceptual claim despite the 
fact that a wider range of information shows him to have 
been wrong. 
There are other kinds of perceptual mistakes besides 
the variety we have dealt with. Returning to the car, now 
in normal lighting, let us consider this perceptual error. 
Suppose that the light reflected from the car's surface and 
transmitted to the observer's eye is blue. Most anyone who 
looks at the car will perceptually claim correctly--he will 
perceive--that the car is blue. But the observer in question 
senses greenly. Here, it seems, we have a different kind 
of perceptual error, not resulting from the paucity of our 
evidence about observation conditions, but one that comes 
about because our senses fail us. But the causal inter-
ference explanation still holds, albeit in modified form. 
A perceptual error of the kind just described results from 
what can be called an "internal," as opposed to an "ex-
ternal," interference in the causal sequence of perceiving. 
If blue light reaches and stimulates one's eye but one 
undergoes a green sensory modification of his consciousness 
this must result from a causal interference originating 
within the observer. His interference may be the result of 
a physiological defect or malfunction, e.g., a form of 
color-blindness, physical damage to the organs involved, 
drug-induced hallucination, etc. 
A second possibility is that the causal interference 
taking place within the observer is the result of psych-
ological malfunction. 'l'he:~r1? are t vrn l.imi ting cases of 
this variety of causal interference. One of these cases, 
which we would not normally call error, is that in which we 
automatically correct our sensory modifications subcon-
sciously so as to integrate relevant independent infor-
mation about observation conditions. The other limiting 
case is that of the outright hallucination, which has no 
causal connection to the external world but results solely 
from psychological factors. In nrinciple, the RTE will 
included reference to all the possibilities for internal 
causal interference. 
If one has all relevant information, not only about 
external observation conditions, but about his own physio-
logical and psychological state, he can have absolutely 
evident perceptual beliefs. In the absenc13 of such an 
ideal state of knowledge, one can still have prima-facie 
evident perceptual beliefs, by taking account of the RTE, 
so far as he is able to. Finally, RTE functions as a guide 
for the whole community of perceivers, as they strive to 
absolutize the store of warranted beliefs about the empirical 
world. 
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